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Abstract 
This study was conducted to address the need for additional financial statement fraud detection 
techniques.  Accruals were chosen as the focus of this study due to the high likelihood of 
financial statement manipulation using accruals.  Using the Dechow/Dichev accrual quality 
model, this study tested whether or not accrual quality can be used as an indicator of financial 
statement fraud.  The study concluded that the Dechow/Dichev model found non-fraudulent 
financial statements to have higher quality accruals than fraudulent financial statements.  In 
addition, accrual quality of non-fraudulent financial statements was found to be significantly 
different from the accrual quality of fraudulent financial statements.  Therefore, accrual quality 
may be considered an indicator of fraudulent financial statement activity. 
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Section 1: Foundation of the Study  
Accruals are a normal part of business; however, the subjective nature of many accrual 
transactions provides an opportunity for overstatement of revenues that will never be realized.  
Because accruals are easily manipulated, this study focuses on accruals as an indicator of 
financial statement fraud.  The results add to the literature on fraud detection techniques that can 
be used by all stakeholders who analyze financial statements. 
Background of the Problem 
 After several notorious accounting scandals in the early 2000s, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 was enacted to increase public confidence in corporate financial statements.  Regardless 
of the increased requirements for executives and auditors, headlines involving corporate fraud 
and material financial misstatements continue to be reported (Abassi, Albrecht, Vance, & 
Hansen, 2012).  Financial statement fraud makes up only 10% of all occupational fraud; 
however, it is the costliest of all types of fraud in the workplace (ACFE, 2016).  Because of the 
significance of accounting improprieties, increased pressure is on auditors to detect financial 
statement fraud (Dorminey, Fleming, Kranacher, & Riley, 2012; Murphy & Dacin, 2011).   
 Users of financial statements include, among others, investors, analysts, auditors, and 
regulators.  The capital markets rely on the financial information provided by companies and 
additional fraud detection techniques may help aid in the exposure of inaccurate reporting.  Just 
as fraud perpetrators are continually finding new ways to commit fraud, corporate stakeholders 
must continue to explore ways to detect it.  Auditors are required to assess the risk of material 
misstatement through analytical procedures (PCAOB, 2010).  Management and investors also 
have an interest in the likelihood of corporate fraud and use internal controls as well as analytical 
procedures to aid in the detection process (Mangala & Kumari, 2015).  This study adds to the 
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literature regarding fraud detection by assessing the likelihood that accrual quality can be used as 
an indicator of fraudulent financial statement activity.  
 Accrued revenues result from timing issues between the earning of revenue and the 
receipt of cash.  Accruals are a normal part of business; however, the subjective nature of many 
accrual transactions provides an opportunity for overstatement of revenues that will never be 
realized.  Income-increasing accruals that are never fully realized must be corrected or reversed 
in later years; however, managers may result to fraudulent transactions to offset the reversals in 
order to avoid the negative effects on income (Perols & Lougee, 2011).  The high likelihood of 
fraudulent misstatements involving accruals necessitates an effective detection technique to 
assess the risk created by the accruals (Dechow, Ge, Larson, & Sloan, 2011; Mangala & Kumari, 
2015; Perols & Lougee, 2011). 
 Corporate fraud research is continually developing to include more advanced ways of 
detecting fraud, including data mining techniques as analytical tools (Mangala & Kumari, 2015; 
Bolton & Hand, 2002; Bian, Cheng, Yang, Yuan, & Li, 2016; Sharma & Panigrahi, 2012).  The 
most recent literature on specific fraud detection techniques explores income tax expense 
(Killen, 2016), price-earnings ratio (Weske & Benuto, 2015), and cash flows (Scott, 2012) as 
indicators of fraud.  Other recent studies that are broader in scope evaluate the relationships 
between firm life cycle and fraud (Chang, 2015) as well as corporate culture and fraud risk 
(Wang & Fargher, 2015).  Interestingly, one study created a language-recognition tool to identify 
the likelihood of fraud based on words in financial reports (Purda & Skillicorn, 2015) and 
another explored digital analysis to predict fraud (Roxas, 2011).  Despite the variety of fraud 
detection literature, a gap exists regarding the detection of fraudulent financial reporting related 
specifically to revenue accrual misstatements. 
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Problem Statement 
 The problem addressed is the lack of fraud detection techniques available to corporate 
stakeholders to assess the risk of fraudulent financial statements associated with revenue 
accruals.  Accruals have been found to be high in years of fraudulent financial statements 
(Dechow et al., 2011).  In addition, Perols and Lougee (2011) also found a relationship between 
accruals and fraudulent financial statements.  After reviewing the literature related to corporate 
fraud prevention, Mangala and Kumari (2015) as well as Sharma and Panigrahi (2012) 
recognized the need for additional research in the area of fraud indicators. 
Purpose Statement 
 The purpose of this quantitative, correlational study is to examine the relationship 
between accrual quality and financial statement fraud.  Prior research has found that companies 
with excessive accruals are more likely to produce fraudulent financial statements (Perols & 
Lougee, 2011; Jones, Krishnan, & Melendrez, 2008).  Although most companies will have 
revenue accruals as a normal part of business, this study attempted to determine if accrual quality 
may be an appropriate detection measure for financial statement fraud. 
Nature of Study 
Method  
 Quantitative research is an approach for “testing objective theories by examining the 
relationship among variables” (Creswell, 2014, p. 4).  Stake (2010) related quantitative research 
to “linear attributes, measurements, and statistical analysis” (p. 11).  Through statistical 
measures, quantitative research allows the researcher to declare a certain level of confidence that 
a finding is statistically significant (Stake, 2010).  The use of the quantitative approach involves 
the statistical analysis of a large sample size.  The conclusions reached will be concluded from a 
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pattern in the data (Creswell, 2014).  The quantitative method was chosen for this study because 
it involves the use of mathematically-based methods to determine the relationship between 
accruals quality and fraudulent financial statement activity.  Specifically related to accounting 
research, quantitative methods have been found to be useful by providing data to which our 
“theoretical generalization must be applied to be of any practical use” (Richardson, 2015, p. 74).   
 Qualitative research attempts to explain a situation or phenomenon that occurs (Creswell, 
2014, p. 4) and relates to “human perception and understanding” (Stake, 2010, p. 11).  
Qualitative research is interpretive, subjective, and situational (Stake, 2010).  If a qualitative 
method was chosen for this study, the conclusions reached would be greatly limited due to the 
small, situational sample size (Stake, 2010).  While the qualitative method is often used in 
accounting research (Richardson, 2015), it was not chosen for this study because the focus is not 
on one particular instance of accounting fraud but on an overall financial statement fraud 
detection technique involving revenue accruals quality. 
 The mixed method merges the quantitative and qualitative methods together by including 
elements of each.  Although results of a mixed-method study are usually considered very strong, 
the complexity of the design is very time-intensive and calls for “clear, visual models to 
understand the details and the flow” as well as extensive data collection (Creswell, 2014, p. 219).  
The mixed method was not practical for this research because the study tested the null hypothesis 
that there is no relationship between accrual quality and financial statement fraud (Creswell, 
2014, p. 3).   
Design  
 This study has a correlational design which describes the relationship between variables 
(Vogt, Vogt, Gardner, & Haeffele, 2014) as well as the nature and magnitude of the relationship 
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between variables (Salkind, 2010).  The correlational design achieved the purpose of this study 
which was to examine the relationship between accrual quality and financial statement fraud.  
The comparison of the revenue accrual quality of fraudulent financial statements to revenue 
accrual quality of non-fraudulent financial statements determined if accrual quality can be used 
(and if so, with what certainty) as a financial statement fraud detection technique. 
 Other quantitative research designs, which were not appropriate for this study, include 
experimental and descriptive designs.  The experimental and quasi-experimental designs of 
quantitative research were not appropriate for this study because there is no intervention with 
pre-tests and post-tests (Edmonds & Kennedy, 2017).  These designs call for independent, 
dependent, and control variables as well as a control procedure with the intention of identifying a 
cause and effect relationship (Salkind, 2010).  This study compared historical data from financial 
statements with no new intervention or procedure to the data.   
 The descriptive, or survey, approach calls for the administration of a survey to a random 
sample of a population or an entire population (Edmonds & Kennedy, 2017).  Surveys are used 
to “observe trends, attitudes, or opinions of the population of interest” (Edmonds & Kennedy, 
2017, p. 133).  This study compared historical data (retrospective analysis) to determine the 
relationship between variables. 
Research Question 
 This study examined the relationship between revenue accruals quality and financial 
statement fraud.  Prior research found that companies with excessive, or poor quality, accruals 
are more likely to produce fraudulent financial statements (Perols & Lougee, 2011; Jones et al., 
2008).  In order to evaluate the usefulness of an accruals quality ratio to detect fraud, the 
following research question was developed: 
  
6 
 Q1:  To what extent does revenue accruals quality differ for public  companies with 
detected financial statement fraud compared to public companies with no detected financial 
statement fraud? 
Hypotheses 
 The following hypotheses was tested: 
H10:  There is no statistically significant difference in revenue accruals quality for 
companies with detected financial statement fraud and similar companies without 
detected financial statement fraud. 
H1a:  There is a statistically significant difference in revenue accruals quality for 
companies with detected financial statement fraud and similar companies without 
detected financial statement fraud. 
 To test this hypothesis, the financial statements of fraudulent and non-fraudulent firms 
were analyzed to determine the accrual quality of each firm.  Once calculated, the results were 
compared to determine if there was a statistically significant difference.  It was expected that the 
accrual quality of fraudulent firms would be significantly worse than the accrual quality of non-
fraudulent firms.  In addition, an independent t-test was used to determine if there was a 
statistically significant relationship between accrual quality and financial statement fraud.  It was 
expected that the accrual quality of fraudulent financial statements would be lower than the 
accrual quality of non-fraudulent financial statements. 
Theoretical Framework 
 The far-reaching consequences of financial statement fraud make the identification of 
fraud detection techniques an ongoing concern for academic researchers, regulators, and 
practitioners (D’Amico & Mafrolla, 2013; Bolton & Hand, 2002; Sharma & Panigrahi, 2012; 
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Abassi et al., 2012).  The most basic and widespread fraud theory, the fraud triangle, is a central 
theory for this study and is discussed first in this section.  Next, theories specifically related to 
financial statement fraud and accrual-related fraud are examined.  All of these philosophies 
provide the theoretical basis for the development of this study. 
The Fraud Triangle 
 Originally developed in 1953 by Donald Cressey, the fraud triangle includes three 
characteristics that are present when someone commits a fraudulent act: pressure, opportunity, 
and rationalization (Cressey, 1953).  This theory has been widely adopted by accounting 
regulators and is included in the authoritative literature in the Statement on Auditing Standard 
(SAS) No. 99: Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, 2002).  SAS No. 
99 includes an appendix that explains the three characteristics of the fraud triangle and lists risk 
factors for each.  This section discusses the original three parts of the fraud triangle and 
concludes with the evolution of the fraud triangle to include more characteristics. 
 Pressure.  Pressure is one of the incentives that motivates an individual to commit fraud 
(Cressey, 1953).  The pressure can come from one or more sources.  Financial pressure may be 
related to personal financial disaster due to bankruptcy, gambling, or addiction (Dellaportas, 
2013).  Organizational financial disaster may be a result of poor financial performance or 
ambitious earnings targets (Lokanan, 2015; Roden, Cox, & Kim, 2016).  Social pressures include 
the appearance of success and egotistical attributes that motivate fraudulent behavior in order to 
influence or impress others (Dellaportas, 2013). 
 Opportunity.  Opportunity must exist in order for fraud to be committed (Cressey, 
1953).  In many cases, executives and managers are in the position to override controls giving 
them the opportunity to alter financial reports (Dellaportas, 2013).  Staff-level accountants may 
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experience a lack of controls that provides an opportunity for embezzlement or misappropriation 
of funds (Murphy & Dacin, 2011).  Accountants and auditors are generally seen as honorable 
and trustworthy individuals; therefore, stakeholders may take their words and reports as given 
with no questions asked (Dellaportas, 2013).  Others may just not understand the complex 
accounting rules and processes and choose to not investigate or ask questions.  This lack of 
checks-and-balances provides the perfect opportunity for those in trustworthy positions to 
conduct fraudulent activity. 
 Rationalization.  The final item that must be present for fraud to occur is rationalization 
(Cressey, 1953).  By telling themselves “they won’t get caught” or “everyone does it,” fraudsters 
make themselves believe that their actions are acceptable and are then able to commit the act 
while remaining in their moral comfort zone (Cressey, 1953; Lokanan, 2015; Dellaportas, 2013).  
Additionally, the manager may weigh the cost and benefit of the action and realize that the “big” 
outcome is worth the “small” risk (Murphy & Dacin, 2011). 
 Evolution of the fraud triangle.  Accounting fraud has certainly grown in complexity 
since Cressey’s original observations in 1953 (Dorminey et al., 2012; McMahon, Pence, 
Bressler, & Bressler, 2016).  Numerous studies on the fraud triangle as it relates to accounting 
fraud has led to the addition of behavioral-based characteristics including capability, ideology, 
arrogance/ego/entitlement, and coercion (Dorminey et al., 2012; Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004).  
Although these additional characteristics are not unanimously adopted and included in the 
regulatory accounting standards, they have been proven to be related to accounting fraud 
(Soltani, 2014).   
 In addition to behavioral considerations, Lokanan (2015) argued that institutional 
practices and societal pressures influence fraud just as much as the original three fraud triangle 
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characteristics.  His research on the socio-political influences on fraud found that these additional 
characteristics should also be considered as financial fraud risk factors (Lokanan, 2015).  
Dorminey et al. (2012) suggested ongoing research related to the causes of accounting fraud in 
order to strengthen the audit risk and detection process. 
Financial Statement Fraud Theories 
 General fraud theories that relate specifically to financial statement fraud include agency 
theory (acting in self-interest), prospect theory (focus on earnings), and motivated-reasoning 
theory (hidden bias; Murphy & Dacin, 2011).  Agency theory adds to the discussion of financial 
statement fraud by explaining the motivation behind the fraud and explaining the relationship 
between the employer/company (the principal) and the employee/manager (the agent).  The 
theory recognizes that the principal and agent will each have different attitudes toward risk and 
each will act in their own self-interest (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Regarding financial statement fraud, 
the contract between the principal and agent (employment contract) may provide an incentive for 
the manager to commit fraud in order to further their own self-interest (i.e., salary bonus for 
meeting an earnings target; Salterio & Webb, 2006).  Although individuals may act more 
honestly than the agency theory suggests (Salterio & Webb, 2006), company stakeholders should 
be aware of the conflicts involved in the employer/employee relationship. 
 Prospect theory was introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) as a descriptive model 
of decision making while under risk.  Although originally applied to gambling and insurance, the 
prospect theory also adds to the discussion of financial statement fraud because it suggests 
decision makers (managers) will act in a way that will meet a goal/prospect (i.e., earnings target).  
According to the prospect theory, decision makers may be risk averse or risk seeking depending 
on their previous experience (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Abdel-Khalik, 2014).  If a previous 
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risk resulted in a gain, the decision maker will be more cautious with future decisions in an 
attempt to secure the increase in wealth; if a risk resulted in a loss, the decision maker will take 
more risks in hopes of making up for the lost wealth (Abdel-Khalik, 2014).  These actions go 
against the rational choice theory that, after a risk pay off, the risk would be repeated (or if the 
risk cost them wealth, the risk would be avoided).   
 The motivated reasoning theory suggests that specific goals affect one’s decision making 
(Kunda, 1990).  In other words, the motivation to meet a goal (i.e., earnings target) enhances the 
use of strategies that are most likely to achieve the goal, including risky strategies (i.e., financial 
statement fraud).  Kunda (1990) concluded that motivations for decision making come from 
either the desire to be accurate (accurate conclusion) or the desire to achieve a goal (directional 
conclusion).  In the case of financial statement fraud, both conclusions apply because financial 
statements must be accurate and goal-oriented.  Other justifications for committing financial 
statement fraud may be monetary gain, improved social status (successfulness), or moral 
justification (more people will be helped than hurt; Murphy & Dacin, 2011). 
Accrual-Related Fraud Theories 
 The fraud triangle explains why people commit all types of fraud, not just financial 
statement fraud.  Therefore, the fraud triangle must be taken a step further to merge with 
accounting- and accrual-related fraud theories in order to have a better understanding of why 
people commit financial statement fraud.  Using results from various research studies, Koch and 
Wall (2000) developed four models that explain the use of excessive discretionary accruals to 
commit financial statement fraud: (a) the occasional big bath theory, (b) the smooth income 
theory, (c) the live for today theory, and (d) the maximize variability theory.  These theories 
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support the current study by explaining the reasoning behind accrual-related fraud and are 
explained and tied back to the fraud triangle discussion in the following paragraphs. 
 The occasional big-bath theory describes the motivation of a manager to use 
discretionary accruals inappropriately in order to achieve quarterly earnings targets (Koch & 
Wall, 2000).  While every quarter’s target may not be reached, an occasional windfall created by 
a fabulous quarter can provide job security and financial benefits for the manager.  This model is 
applicable to the pressure dimension of the fraud triangle. 
 Under the smooth income theory, managers use earnings management techniques to alter 
accruals in order to provide a more stable earnings timeline (Koch & Wall, 2000).  If actual 
earnings exceed the target, the manager will reduce reported earnings.  If actual earnings are less 
than the target, the manager will increase reported earnings.  Generally, these actions are taken 
when there is a financial penalty for earnings not being on target or if the manager thinks that 
stakeholders appreciate stability (Zhang, 2016; Koch & Wall, 2000).  This theory is related to the 
rationalization characteristic of the fraud triangle. 
 The live for today theory explains why managers participate in earnings management by 
always minimizing discretionary accruals and, therefore, always maximizing net income (Koch 
& Wall, 2000).  Perhaps the individual is planning to retire or leave the company and chooses to 
maximize current period earnings.  This shortsightedness effect could also be a result of reaching 
earnings targets in order to keep his/her job.  This action would fall under the pressure and 
rationalization dimensions of the fraud triangle. 
 Finally, the maximize variability theory is used when managers manipulate discretionary 
accruals to move further away from their earnings target (Koch & Wall, 2000).  This risky move 
would be taken by a manager in order to prepare for a stellar performance in a future quarter.  By 
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manipulating accruals to under-report their current earnings, future earnings that may actually be 
mediocre will appear to be much higher than expected.  This method falls under the 
rationalization and pressure realms of the fraud triangle. 
 This study tested the usefulness of a revenue accrual quality ratio as an indication of 
financial statement fraud.  The theoretical basis for the development of this study is explained by 
combining the concepts of the fraud triangle with specific accrual-related fraud theories.  
Understanding the characteristics of fraud combined with the psychology of why people commit 
financial statement fraud creates a theoretical framework for this study.  
Definition of Terms 
 Accrual quality: the measure of the extent to which working capital accruals are realized 
in future cash flows.  If cash flows are not eventually realized, the quality of the recorded 
accruals was low.  If cash flows are subsequently realized, the quality of the previously recorded 
accruals was high (Dechow & Dichev, 2002). 
 Discretionary accrual: an accrual that is not imperative to the main function of the 
business and may or may not eventually be realized.  An example would be estimated upcoming 
executive bonuses.  The dollar amounts of discretionary accruals are subjective, estimated, and 
provide an opportunity for fraudulent manipulations (Ghosh & Olsen, 2009). 
 Earnings management: management’s use of judgement in financial reporting (or 
structuring of transactions) to mislead or influence stakeholders of the company.  Generally, 
earnings management is used when the firm’s performance is poor or to meet contractual 
requirements (Healy & Wahlen, 1999).  Earnings management is not necessarily fraudulent; the 
use of earnings management to mislead users of the financial statements is fraudulent.  Accrual-
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based earnings management may include the under-accruing of expenses, delaying an asset 
write-down, or recognizing revenue prematurely (Bartov & Cohen, 2009). 
 Financial statement fraud: occurs when firms intentionally violate accounting rules and 
regulations to create incorrect financial statements (Roxas, 2011).  Financial statement fraud may 
also be referred to as misstated financial statements or fraudulent financial statements. 
 Material misstatement: a significant error, either intentional or accidental, in the financial 
statements of a company.  The materiality threshold changes depending on the size of the 
company, among other things.  Intentional material misstatements are considered fraud (Gupta & 
Gill, 2012). 
 Nondiscretionary accrual: an accrual that is caused by the operations of the business 
(Ayers, Jiang, & Yeung, 2006).  The firm is obligated to pay the expense.  An example is an 
electric bill received but not paid.  The amount is specific and exact and can be verified.   
 Revenue accruals: revenue that is reported on the income statement but cash has not been 
received (Ghosh & Olsen, 2009).  Instead of receiving cash, the firm creates a receivable due 
from the customer to the company.  The receivable is expected to be collected in a future period. 
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
Assumptions 
 This study used information obtained through the Security and Exchange Commission’s 
(SEC) Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER) database.  Because enforcement 
actions are issued with significant investigation, information within the AAERs is assumed 
accurate and complete.  Once a company was identified for this study, additional research was 
conducted to make sure the information provided by the AAER database was up-to-date and the 
investigation was considered ongoing or concluded.  Because the sample for this study included 
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companies with fraudulent financial statements, the additional research mitigated the risk that the 
investigation by the SEC was dropped, but not updated in the AAER database.   
Limitations 
 The sample was limited to AAERs issued in the years of 2015 and 2016.  Only those 
companies identified by the SEC and issued an AAER during those years were included in the 
sample.  Another limitation of this study is that it attempted to identify the relationship between 
accrual quality and financial statement fraud, but did not attempt to determine causation.     
Delimitations 
 The sample of this study was limited to AAERs issued during the years of 2015 and 2016 
only.  The SEC issues AAERs to any publicly traded U.S company that has been identified and 
investigated for committing fraud (Perols & Lougee, 2011); therefore, this study only 
investigated the relationship between revenue accruals and intentional fraudulent activity.  In 
addition, this study was based only on public company information.  No privately held 
companies or governmental agencies were included in the selected sample.  The conclusions 
reached by this research are limited in scope concerning fraud detection by revenue accrual 
quality only.  Other fraud detection techniques were not considered in this study. 
Significance of Study 
Reduction in Gaps 
 This study adds to the literature on detecting fraudulent financial statement activity by 
using an accruals-related analytical procedure.  Although there are many ways to detect financial 
statement fraud, this study adds to the current literature available on fraud detection techniques 
by providing evidence of the usefulness (or uselessness) of using accrual quality to detect 
financial statement fraud.  Firms are constantly finding more creative ways to commit fraud; 
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therefore, fraud researchers must also continually revise their detection techniques (Mangala & 
Kumari, 2015; Abassi et al., 2012; Bian et al., 2016). 
Implications for Biblical Integration 
 Just as Christians have rules and examples to follow given by our Lord, businesses have 
rules and regulations to follow in the conduct and reporting of their operations.  Governing 
authorities (the FASB, SEC, etc.) issue business rules and we are instructed to follow the laws 
and rules provided by these authorities (Romans 13:1-2).  However, Biblical concepts may also 
be applied to business situations so that the tough ethical questions have clear answers 
(Chewning, Eby, & Roels, 1990).  Unfortunately, the Bible does not specifically address many of 
the issues that we encounter in today’s business world.  However, the mention of integrity and 
honesty throughout the Bible (just a few examples include Matthew 5:8, Proverbs 21:3, Psalm 
25:21, Psalm 112, NIV) give instructions on how to live Christ-like lives and run businesses in a 
Christian way.  How wonderful would it be if all businesses would merge the Biblical principles 
of integrity and honesty with the accounting regulations set forth for them to follow?   
 Businesspeople face ethical issues of all kinds including dishonesty, corruption, 
embezzlement, fraud, and pay inequality (Gill & Erisman, 2016).  For this study, which focuses 
specifically on the ethical issue of fraud, the application of Biblical principles to the fraud 
triangle characteristics of pressure and rationalization provide insight on ways that Christians can 
overcome this unethical behavior.  Pressure can come from a variety of sources including 
financial pressures and social pressures (Dellaportas, 2013).  The Bible provides direction on 
how to properly manage our finances in order to avoid personal financial disaster (Proverbs 3:9-
10) as well as how to define success in order to avoid social pressures (Matthew 16:26).  Each of 
these passages provides an understanding of what God intends for us to do with our money and 
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God’s definition of success (Idleman, 2013).  Success should not be measured by the acquisition 
of monetary wealth but by the acquisition of eternal life (Luke 18:18-30). 
 In addition to pressure, rationalization is also present when fraud occurs (Cressey, 1953; 
Lokanan, 2015; Dellaportas, 2013).  The act of rationalization involves the weighing of the costs 
and benefits prior to committing the fraud and concluding that the benefits of the illegal action 
are worth the risk (Murphy & Dacin, 2011).  Jesus said, “For what will it profit a man if he gains 
the whole world and forfeits his soul?” (Matthew 16:26).  This passage is a reminder of the true 
costs of unethical behavior and reverses the justification for the fraudulent act.  Putting God first 
and removing the idolatry of monetary and social success reduces the pressure and 
rationalization present during the fraudulent activity (Albertson, 2016).   
 Christianity is a lived experience that extends far past the walls of a church.  We are 
called to “always strive to do what is good for each other and for everyone else” in all parts of 
our lives (1 Thessalonians 5:15).  Christians in business are called to serve God by enabling their 
communities to flourish (Van Duzer, 2010) and this study aids authorities, auditors, and 
management in the detection of fraud.  By detecting misstatements in financial statements, we 
are adhering to this calling by making the information more useful and accurate for all 
stakeholders’ decision making. 
Relationship to Field of Study 
 Accounting is commonly known as the language of business because every organization 
has financial transactions.  The manipulation of financial statements is the costliest type of fraud 
in the workplace (ACFE, 2016).  In order for financial statements to be informative to 
stakeholders, they must be accurate.  This study is directly related to the accounting cognate 
  
17 
because it is the analysis of financial statements (accruals quality in particular) to detect 
fraudulent activity. 
A Review of the Professional and Academic Literature 
 This literature review covers the most important topics that support this study of using 
revenue accruals quality as an indicator of financial statement fraud.  To begin, accrual- and 
auditing-related accounting standards are examined as set forth in professional and practitioner 
materials.  Following the discussion of professional literature, academic literature is reviewed.  
Because the accounting profession is subject to oversight by governing agencies, it is imperative 
to mention the regulations and standards that accountants and auditors must follow prior to 
evaluating fraud theory and the most recent research studies in the academic literature.  Included 
in the review of academic literature are topics of (a) financial statement fraud, (b) accruals and 
earnings management, (c) theoretical framework, (d) the use of accruals in accounting research, 
and (e) the use of accruals to detect financial statement fraud (including research variables and 
accrual ratios).  Figure 1 below summarizes the topics of this literature review in graphic form. 
 
 Figure 1: Literature Review Concept Map.  
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Professional Literature 
 Accounting professionals are required to adhere to principles set forth by several 
organizations including the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), and the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA; Johnstone, Gramling, & Rittenberg, 2016; Kassem & Higson, 2012; 
Dorminey et al., 2012).  Therefore, accounting standards and regulations must be acknowledged 
in any study related to financial reporting.  Particularly related to this study are the FASB’s 
Accounting Standards Update (ASU) 2014-09, the FASB’s Statement of Financial Accounting 
Concept No. 8, the PCAOB’s Auditing Standard 2110, and the AICPA’s guidance on the 
Statement on Auditing Standard (SAS) No. 99.  The most significant guidance available in the 
professional and practitioner literature is discussed in the next paragraphs. 
 FASB ASU 2014-09.  On May 28, 2014, the FASB issued ASU 2014-09, Revenue from 
Contracts with Customers (Topic 606).  This standard update is a result of a joint effort between 
the FASB and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to clarify and harmonize 
the principles for revenue recognition using United States Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (U.S. GAAP) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).  ASU 2014-09 
provides a principle-based approach for revenue recognition and eliminates various industry- and 
transaction-specific rules making revenue recognition uniform for all reporting entities.  In 
addition, enhanced disclosures are required to provide further analysis of reported revenue 
(FASB, 2014).  As a result, U.S. GAAP and IFRS are now closely aligned to allow a fair 
comparison of company revenues regardless of industry or transaction type.   
 The key concept of ASU 2014-09 is that an entity should “recognize revenue when (or 
as) it satisfies a performance obligation by transferring a promised good or service to a 
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customer” (FASB, 2014, p. 5).  If a contract contains many different performance obligations, 
each should be separated with an appropriate monetary value.  Revenue should be recognized as 
each performance obligation is completed rather than based on the completion percentage of the 
entire contract.   
 This basic accrual principle is the framework for revenue reporting; however, ASU 2014-
09 clarifies and simplifies the revenue recognition process to provide comparability of revenues 
from a variety of industries and capital markets (FASB, 2014).  Accrual accounting is an integral 
part of the current study; therefore, an understanding of this updated revenue recognition 
standard is an imperative part of the literature review.  However, this new standard does not 
affect this study because early adoption of ASU 2014-09 is not permitted for public entities.  
Historical company data (prior to 2017) was analyzed in this study (Rosenhouse, 2014). 
 FASB SFAC No. 8.  FASB Concept Statement No. 8 defines accrual accounting and 
explains the justification for using accrual accounting when reporting the performance of an 
organization.  It states that accrual accounting provides better information on the economic 
activity of the business than the cash-basis accounting method (FASB, 2010).  Cash-basis 
accounting relies on inflow of cash to record revenue and an outflow of cash to record an 
expense.  However, revenue may actually be earned without cash being received in the current 
period and expenses incurred without cash being paid in the current period.  This timing problem 
is mitigated by using the accrual basis where revenues are booked when earned and expenses are 
booked when incurred (Dechow, 1994).  There is a trade-off, however, in using the accrual basis 
rather than the easy-to-prove cash basis because managers have some discretion over the accrued 
amounts (Dechow, 1994; Healy & Wahlen, 1999).  Therefore, even though the accrual basis may 
provide a more accurate picture of the business’s activity, it also provides an opportunity for 
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fraudulent financial statement activity through subjective estimates of discretionary accruals 
(Perols & Lougee, 2011; Dechow, 1994; Healy & Wahlan, 1999).  Nonetheless, standard setters 
agree that the accrual basis more accurately reports a firm’s performance because accruals must 
be “objective and verifiable” which limits management’s discretion when reporting accruals 
(Dechow, 1994, p. 8). 
 FASB Concept Statement No. 8 relates directly to this study because it defines the 
purpose of financial reporting as providing “financial information about the reporting entity that 
is useful to (stakeholders) in making decisions about providing resources to the entity” (FASB, 
2010, p. 1).  Stakeholders are identified as investors, lenders, creditors, and regulators and the 
importance of accurate and useable information is implied throughout this statement (FASB, 
2010).  This concept statement highlights the importance of accurate financial statements and, 
therefore, the need for tools to aid in the detection of fraudulent financial statement activity. 
 Fraud-related auditing standards and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  The PCAOB 
and the AICPA are the main governing agencies for audit procedures.  The PCAOB was created 
as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) to help improve investor confidence in 
corporations.  The PCAOB’s primary purpose is to oversee public accounting firms that audit 
publicly-traded corporations.  The PCAOB establishes and enforces rules on auditing, quality 
control, ethics, and independence (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002).  The PCAOB’s Auditing 
Standard No. 2110 provides guidance related to identifying and assessing risk of material 
misstatements.  Under this standard, auditors are required to perform analytical procedures in 
order to identify unusual relationships involving revenue accounts (PCAOB, 2010).  The 
identification of unexpected account relationships might indicate a material misstatement, 
including material misstatement due to fraud (PCAOB, 2010).  This study of accruals as an 
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indicator of financial statement fraud adds to the literature on analytical procedures and the risk 
assessment process. 
 Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99 (SAS 99), issued by the AICPA’s Auditing 
Standards Board (ASB), describes fraud and sets documentation and engagement requirements 
for the auditing team.  In addition, risk assessment, communication, and controls are addressed 
as they relate to audit procedures.  The AICPA’s guidance on SAS No. 99 provides criteria for 
auditors’ fieldwork related to assessing the likelihood of fraud (Dorminey et al., 2012).  Fraud 
risk is defined as “the risk that the client and its management would intentionally cause the 
financial statements to be materially misstated” (Hammersley, Johnstone, & Kadous, 2011, p. 
86).  Auditors are required to conduct a preliminary fraud risk assessment in the planning stage 
of the audit because thorough planning increases the likelihood of a high quality audit (Power, 
2013; Raslan, Hegazy, & Eldawla, 2016; Mangala & Kumari, 2015).  AU §316.28 provides 
examples of analytical procedures that may be red flags that are helpful in identifying unusual 
activity (AICPA, 2007).  For example, the comparison of sales volume (as determined from 
recorded revenue amounts) with production capacity is useful since excess sales volume over 
production capacity may be indicative of recording fictitious sales.  Another example provided 
involves a trend analysis of monthly revenues and monthly sales returns during and shortly after 
the reporting period.  This procedure may indicate the existence of undisclosed side agreements 
with customers to return goods that would affect revenue recognition (AICPA, 2007).  It must be 
noted that the presence of a red flag merely indicates the potential for financial statement fraud 
and does not “ensure the presence of fraud” (Mangala & Kumari, 2015, p. 54).  The current 
study examines accruals quality as an indicator of financial statement fraud and adds to the 
literature on analytical procedures that may help detect financial statement fraud. 
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 In addition to creating the PCAOB to oversee the audit process, the SOX Act of 2002 
brought attention to the act of financial statement fraud by increasing criminal and civil penalties 
for white-collar crime, increasing the requirements for disclosures, and specifying responsible 
parties (corporate responsibility).  Many studies have compared earnings management prior to 
SOX and after SOX.  Some studies indicate that earnings management increased significantly 
after the implementation of SOX (Cohen, Dey, & Lys, 2008; Bartov & Cohen, 2009) while other 
studies suggest SOX resulted in very few changes in earnings management (Ghosh, Marra, & 
Moon, 2010).  A study by Cohen et al. (2008) suggested that real earnings management, as 
opposed to accrual-based earnings management, increased after the passage of SOX.  Bartov and 
Cohen (2009) found similar results when they examined over 10,000 firm-quarter observations 
ranging from 1987 through 2006 and applied a modified cross-sectional Jones model (Jones, 
1991) to compare earnings management in pre-SOX years and post-SOX years.  Although the 
SOX’s oversight rules, stricter penalties, and increased regulations on financial reporting should 
have deterred management from fraudulent financial reporting, Bartov and Cohen (2009) found 
that earnings management actually increased in the post-SOX period.   
 On the other hand, Ghosh et al. (2010) examined over 9,000 observations from US 
publicly traded firms between 1998 and 2005 and found “no evidence to suggest that the overall 
level of earnings management declined following SOX” (p. 1145).  Gavious and Rosenboim 
(2013) evaluated the relationship between earnings quality, market conditions (stock price), and 
government regulation (SOX).  They found an increase in earnings quality (reduction in 
abnormal accruals) just prior to the passage of SOX.  Therefore, they concluded that the reduced 
earnings management was due to the exposure of the many accounting scandals and an increase 
in investor awareness rather than due to the passage of SOX (Gavious & Rosenboim, 2013).   
  
23 
 More recently, Jordan, Clark, and Pate (2015) examined the third decimal digit in EPS 
and, prior to SOX, found a significant number of instances of earnings manipulation so that EPS 
could be rounded up to the next penny.  For periods after SOX, this form of earnings 
management was practically eliminated (Jordan et al., 2015).  The current study focused on 
accrual-based earnings manipulation; these former studies show the inconsistencies in research 
findings regarding earnings management and, therefore, the importance of more research in this 
area.  
 “SOX’s impact on earnings management appears inconclusive at this point and further 
research in the area is warranted” (Jordan et al., p. 154).  Regardless of the existing guidance 
available to auditors and the increased literature provided after the passage of SOX, Kassem and 
Higson (2012) found that even more guidance related to fraud risk assessment is needed from 
standard setters.  They reviewed academic research studies to explore the reasons for the audit 
expectation gap and to measure the efforts of standards setters to narrow the gap (Kassem & 
Higson, 2012).  They proposed that standard setters and external auditors are not doing enough 
to detect financial statement fraud and there is, therefore, a gap that needs to be narrowed.  
Because of the evidence of recent increases in earnings management and the difficulty in 
detecting it, more earnings management research is warranted.  This study adds to the fraud 
detection and risk assessment literature by evaluating the relationship between accrual quality 
and financial statement fraud. 
Academic Literature 
 Although the professional/practitioner literature provides regulations and guidance for 
accrual accounting and auditing accrued revenues, a review of the academic literature aids in the 
practical implementation of the standards and procedures accountants and auditors are required 
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to follow.  This section of the literature review evaluates, defines, and discusses the following 
topics: (a) financial statement fraud (including detection techniques and risk assessment), (b) 
accruals and earnings management, (c) theoretical framework, (d) accruals in accounting 
research, and (e) accruals to detect financial statement fraud (including research variables and 
accrual ratios). 
 Financial statement fraud.  Financial statement fraud is an ongoing problem; therefore, 
the definition and evaluation of financial statement fraud has been part of academic literature for 
decades.  In fact, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) estimates that, of all 
occupational fraud types, the largest median losses result from financial statement fraud (ACFE, 
2016).  Roxas (2011) defined financial statement fraud as the intentional violation of GAAP 
through the manipulation of earnings.  Gupta and Gill (2012) defined financial statement fraud as 
“a deliberate misstatement of material facts by management in the books of account of a 
company with the aim of deceiving investors and creditors” (p. 150).  Fraud involves an 
intentional act; therefore, it is important to prove that the misstatements were intentional rather 
than accidental (Kim, Baik, & Cho, 2016).  Accidental misstatements are usually smaller and 
less significant errors than fraudulent misstatements that can cause drastic problems in the 
financial markets (Kim et al., 2016). 
 Mangala and Kumari (2015) reviewed research from 1984 through 2014 and found that a 
variety of fraud detection techniques are necessary to curb fraud effectively and more research is 
needed regarding corporate financial reporting fraud.  Many studies have attempted to improve 
the fraud detection process including using techniques such as digital analysis (Roxas, 2011), 
annual report word choice (Purda & Skillicorn, 2015), and data mining (Gupta & Gill, 2012).  In 
addition, data mining is becoming more popular as a fraud detection technique because of the 
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ability to handle large, complex quantities of financial data (Sharma & Panigrahi, 2012).  
Nonetheless, numerous researchers emphasize the importance of new detection techniques that 
can keep up with the constantly changing fraudulent activity and can warn stakeholders of the 
potential of fraud (Abassi et al., 2012; Bolton & Hand, 2002; Golden, Meyerson, Brockett, & 
Wortham, 2013; McMahon et al., 2016; Bian et al., 2016).     
 As discussed earlier in the professional literature section, auditors must assess the risk of 
fraud as part of their audit procedures.  One part of the fraud risk assessment is an evaluation of 
accruals.  While abnormal accruals may not be the most important red flag for the detection of 
financial statement fraud, they are certainly one of many areas that should be considered 
(Gullkvist & Jokipii, 2013).  Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2001) found that auditors do not 
consider high accruals as an indicator of future earnings problems.  They contend that auditors 
may think that it is not their responsibility to alert investors of possible future financial statement 
fraud or maybe they lack the sophisticated detection techniques to signal such earnings 
management (Bradshaw et al., 2001).  Nonetheless, additional research is warranted regarding 
audit procedures to detect fraud as well as the responsibility of auditors to alert investors of the 
potential for future financial statement fraud (Bradshaw et al., 2001; Sharma & Panigrahi, 2012).   
 Accruals and earnings management.  A firm’s revenues are made up of (1) income that 
has been earned and cash received (cash flows) and (2) income that has been earned but cash has 
not yet been received (accrued revenues; Ghosh & Olsen, 2009).  The quality of earnings is 
generally defined as the “magnitude of estimation errors in accruals” (McNichols, 2002, p. 61; 
Dichow & Dichev, 2002).  The estimation error is defined as the “difference between the amount 
accrued and the amount realized” through cash flows (McNichols, 2002, p. 62).  Although the 
recording of accrued transactions is allowed by GAAP and a common practice, this procedure 
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can easily turn into fraudulent earnings management if used to mislead the users of financial 
statements (Ayers et al., 2006; Badertscher, Collins, & Lys, 2012; D’Amico & Mafrolla, 2013; 
Dechow, Hutton, Kim, & Sloan, 2012; Perols & Lougee, 2011; Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Dechow, 
1994; Foster & Shastri, 2013; Gerakos, 2012).  The fraudulent use of accruals results in accruals 
that do not reverse in future periods while the correct use of accruals will result in the realization 
(or reversal) of the accrued amounts (Perols & Lougee, 2011).     
 Accounting crime investigators stress the importance of fraud indicators related to 
financial statement fraud more than those related to internal control weaknesses (Gullkvist & 
Jokipii, 2013).  While the ambiguity of accruals may make them difficult to use as variables in 
the detection of financial statement fraud (Ball, 2013) and some doubt that accruals are useful in 
detecting fraud because they are already heavily examined by auditors (Raslan et al., 2016), 
accruals are nonetheless a main avenue for financial reporting manipulation and should continue 
to be a topic of discussion and research.   
 Theoretical framework.  Fraud theory is a broad subject that explains the characteristics 
of fraudsters and the environment in which fraud occurs (Dorminey et al., 2012).  A clear 
understanding of the reasoning and psychology of those who commit (or are likely to commit) 
fraud is important in identifying and reducing financial statement fraud risk (Murphy & Dacin, 
2011; Power, 2013; Brytting, Minogue, & Morino, 2011).  Auditors must understand the 
motivations and conditions present when fraud takes place in order to accurately assess the 
potential for fraud and develop their audit procedures according to the risk presented (Dorminey 
et al., 2012).  The following theories make up the theoretical framework for this study by 
explaining the conditions present when fraud occurs: the fraud triangle, accrual-related fraud 
theories, agency theory, prospect theory, and motivated reasoning theory. 
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 Fraud triangle.  Originally developed by Cressey (1953) in the mid-20th century, the 
fraud triangle explains the circumstances present when fraud occurs: opportunity, rationalization, 
and pressure/incentive.  While each part of the fraud triangle is present when fraud occurs, they 
do not have to be present in equal amounts (Brytting et al., 2011).  Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) 
added a fourth characteristic, capability, which includes the traits and abilities that must be 
present for fraud to be perpetuated in the presence of the other three characteristics.  Evidence 
from their vast fraud investigation experience led them to the conclusion that a fraudster must 
also, in addition to the fraud triangle circumstances, possess certain traits in order to actually go 
through with a fraudulent act (Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004).  Traits include the knowledge of 
business processes, the intelligence to exploit internal controls, a strong ego, a persuasive 
personality, the successful management of stress, and the ability to lie effectively (Wolfe & 
Hermanson, 2004).  Dellaportas’s (2013) study of inmate accountants supported Wolfe and 
Hermanson’s findings that specialized knowledge and a trustworthy personality are necessary for 
fraud to occur.  Accountants’ unique position in the company allows them to gain trust and 
become very familiar with the internal control processes, including how to bypass the controls 
(Dellaportas, 2013).   
 Soltani (2014) argued that the fraud triangle should also consider the environmental, 
regulatory, and ethical climate of the organization.  Additionally, Lokanan (2015) challenged the 
fraud triangle as a legitimate theory when assessing fraud risk and concluded that the fraud 
triangle provides a “limited conception of fraud” and should not be solely relied upon by auditors 
when assessing fraud risks (p. 220).  He argued that the corporate culture and surrounding 
environment (including institutional processes and practices) should be considered when 
evaluating conditions and behaviors that could lead to fraud (Lokanan, 2015).  Findings of 
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McMahon et al. (2016) agreed with Lokanan that auditors should move beyond the fraud triangle 
when evaluating fraud risks. 
 The term “fraud” includes actions of petty employee theft, embezzlement of funds, 
significant fraudulent financial reporting, and misappropriation of assets (Soltani, 2014).  
Because of this broad definition of fraud, it is important to narrow down the discussion of the 
fraud triangle to financial statement fraud in particular.  Roden et al. (2016) applied the concepts 
of Cressey’s fraud triangle in predicting corporate fraud and, like Lokanan (2015), found that 
corporate culture and the structure of the board of directors is an important part of the fraud risk 
discussion.  They applied the characteristics of opportunity, pressure, and rationalization to 103 
firms that had been issued AAERs by the SEC for financial statement fraud from 2003-2010.  
After comparing the results to those of a matched sample of similar, non-fraudulent firms, they 
found that fraud is more likely when there are fewer women, more insiders, and the CEO serves 
as the chair of the board of directors (Roden et al., 2016).  Although they did not dispute 
Cressey’s fraud triangle theory, they concluded that attention should also be focused on the 
corporate culture and the organizational make-up of the board of directors (Roden et al., 2016). 
 Accrual-related fraud theories.  Narrowing down the discussion of financial statement 
fraud theory to accrual-related financial statement fraud theory was the topic of Koch and Wall’s 
(2000) study.  They studied the actions of several CEOs during periods of sub-target earnings as 
well as during the period right before they left the company.  The use of discretionary 
accruals/earnings management was found to be significant in both scenarios.  The four accrual-
related fraud theories that came from the study include live for today, smooth income, maximize 
variability, and the occasional big bath (Koch & Wall, 2000).  Figure 2 summarizes the actions 
of minimizing or maximizing discretionary accruals to achieve an intended result: 
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Figure 2:  Possible Outcomes in the General Case.  Adapted from (Koch & Wall, 2000). 
 
 Koch and Wall’s (2000) live for today theory explains a manager’s reasoning for 
maximizing net income in the current period in order to meet a short-term target.  Perhaps they 
are not planning to be with the company much longer and are maximizing profit while they can 
(Koch & Wall, 2000).  The smooth income theory describes the manipulation of accruals to 
provide a more stable earnings timeline (Koch & Wall, 2000; Zhang, 2016).  The maximize 
variability theory refers to a manager’s use of accruals to move further away from earnings 
targets in order to prepare for an extraordinary future quarter; the under-reporting of current 
earnings will make below-average future earnings appear fabulous (Koch & Wall, 2000).  
Finally, the occasional big bath theory describes management’s motivation to inappropriately 
record accruals in order to report an occasional windfall quarter (Koch & Wall, 2000).  Their 
findings add to the literature on linking earnings management fraud and compensation; in 
addition, their conclusions add to the theoretical framework of this study, which seeks to link 
accruals to financial statement fraud. 
 Healy and Wahlen (1999) reviewed the literature and found evidence of three reasons 
that managers conduct earnings management fraud.  The first is capital market motivations; their 
study showed that some firms managed earnings for stock market purposes.  However, the 
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frequency and magnitude of earnings management for capital market purposes was not identified 
(Healy & Wahlen, 1999).  The second incentive for managers’ earnings management related to 
contract incentives.  Management compensation and lending agreements are often tied to 
earnings; therefore, there is an incentive to manage earnings to manipulate bonuses, ensure job 
security, and adhere to debt covenants (Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Dion, 2016).  The final 
motivation evident from their study related to regulatory motivations including government and 
industry rules.  Again, the frequency and magnitude of earnings management for this purpose 
was not identified (Healy & Wahlen, 1999).  All of the theories mentioned in this section provide 
a theoretical framework that provided a foundation for the current study. 
 Agency theory.  Beginning as an economic theory, agency theory has evolved to be one 
of the leading theories in accounting literature (Murphy & Dacin, 2011).  Agency theory, first 
proposed by Mitnick (1973) and Ross (1973), seeks to define the relationship between a 
principal (i.e., employer) and an agent (i.e., employee).  Although the agent is hired to act in the 
best interest of the principal, the theory states that the agent may act in his or her own self-
interest rather than in the best interest of the agent.  This conflict is a result of differing goals and 
attitudes of risk by the principal and agent (Eisenhardt, 1989; Gerard & Weber, 2014).  In an 
attempt to resolve the agency problem of differing goals, agent compensation is often attached to 
the earnings of a company (i.e., stock options or earnings bonuses).  This creates an incentive for 
the manager to manipulate earnings so that they (the agent) and the company/shareholders (the 
principal) are both better off…until the fraud is uncovered (Dion, 2016; Healy & Wahlen, 1999).  
While research shows that individuals may act more honestly than the agency theory suggests 
(Salterio & Webb, 2006), company stakeholders should recognize the conflict explained by the 
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agency theory and address the motivation to commit fraud created by management’s 
employment contract.   
 The most recent research on agency theory as it applies specifically to accounting fraud 
includes studies by Dion (2016) and Shi, Connelly, and Hoskisson (2016).  Dion (2016) explored 
executives’ opportunistic (fraudulent) behavior and applied characteristics of three philosophical 
egoisms: self-interested yet compassionate (Adam Smith), self-interested and prudent yet 
yearning for power (Thomas Hobbes), and self-interested while leading with power and 
provoking fear in others (Machiavelli).  His study found that executives with Smithian 
characteristics are not likely to commit financial statement fraud because they balance their self-
interest with concern for others.  Hobbesian executives are more inclined to commit financial 
fraud than the Smithian executive because of their hunger for power.  Executives with 
Machiavellian tendencies are the most likely to commit financial statement fraud because of their 
unclear understanding of virtue and vice (Dion, 2016). 
 Shi et al. (2016) also applied agency theory to accounting fraud in their study of external 
corporate governance and financial statement fraud.  They evaluated 265 cases of financial 
statement fraud from 1999-2012 based on the SEC’s AAER database.  The external corporate 
governance variables tested included (a) dedicated institutional ownership (the ratio of total 
shares held by dedicated institutional investors to total shares outstanding), (b) takeover defense 
provisions (staggered board, limitation of amending bylaws and charter, supermajority to 
approve a merger, golden parachute, and poison pill), and (c) analysts’ recommendation pressure 
(sum of the average percent of sell recommendations and buy recommendations issued by 
securities analysts; Shi et al., 2016).  Although external corporate governance is implemented to 
decrease the likelihood of corporate financial fraud, Shi et al. (2016) found these controls can 
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actually increase the likelihood of financial fraud.  These findings add to the literature on 
financial statement fraud detection by identifying the likelihood of financial statement fraud 
amid various provisions to prevent it. 
 Prospect theory.  Originally proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), prospect theory 
is an alternative to the expected utility theory that acknowledges the decision maker’s awareness 
of risk based on sure gains or losses (certainty effect) and their tendency to isolate components 
that are common among all options (isolation effect).  The prospect theory breaks down the 
decision process into two phases: editing and evaluation.  In the first phase, options are coded, 
combined, or cancelled based on their probable outcomes.  Then, the options (prospects) are 
evaluated based on their value and the option with the highest value is chosen (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979).  The prospect theory proposes that decision makers can be both risk averse and 
risk seeking depending on the outcome of each option (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Abdel-
Khalik, 2014).  An option resulting in a gain makes the decision maker against taking on 
additional risk that might mitigate the gain; on the other hand, an option resulting in a loss makes 
the decision maker take on more risk in hopes of a larger payout (Abdel-Khalik, 2014).  This is 
against the rational choice theory that a loss would make one extra careful in decision making 
(Abdel-Khalik, 2014).  Thirteen years after the development of the prospect theory, Kahneman 
and Tversky expanded their research on the subject and concluded that losses are two to two-
and-a-half times more significant in decision making than gains of the same size (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992; Jiang, Lu, Shan, & Zhu, 2016).  In other words, avoiding losses is a more 
significant motivator in the commitment of fraud rather than the potential for gains. 
 Several notable studies have applied the concepts of prospect theory to accounting fraud.  
Abdel-Khalik (2014) selected 60 accounting fraud cases from around the world that cost $200 
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million or more of losses.  His research concluded that the “risk-seeking behavior in the manner 
predicted by the prospect theory is observable in the real world” (Abdel-Khalik, 2014, p. 81).  
Jiang et al. (2016) evaluated companies to determine if accounts were manipulated to avoid 
reporting negative working capital.  Their results, concurring with the prospect theory, showed 
that the negative assessment of working capital deficits “significantly outweighs the positive 
assessment associated with reporting a working capital surplus of the same magnitude” (Jiang et 
al., 2016, pp. 109-110).   
 In 2015, Wasiuzzaman, Sahafzadeh, and Nejad tested the influence of the prospect theory 
on earning management activity.  After using the earnings distribution model to test 538 firms 
from 15 countries, they found that the prospect theory is applicable when explaining executive 
motivation to manage earnings; however, it is not as effective when considering industries 
separately.  Industry characteristics such as competitiveness, profitability, leverage, and capital 
intensity were found to influence managed earnings.  They concluded that standard setters, 
researchers, and stakeholders should “focus on both firm and industry-level variables when 
assessing earnings management activities” (Wasiuzzaman et al., 2015, p. 344).  
 Most recently, Petrou and Procopiou (2016) applied the concepts of the prospect theory 
to CEO shareholdings and earnings manipulation.  Their research concluded that CEOs with 
shareholdings are risk averse when it comes to earnings management.  However, when the CEO 
holds dual positions (chief executive and board chair) there is increased motivation to manipulate 
earnings because of their powerful position (Petrou & Procopiou, 2016).  They suggested that 
corporate boards of directors evaluate executive compensation and governance systems to ensure 
controls are in place to mitigate the chance of fraudulent earnings management (Petrou & 
Procopiou, 2016). 
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 Motivated reasoning theory.  Kunda (1990) was the first to explore the relationship 
between reason and rationality.  He proposed that decision makers are motivated to arrive at a 
particular conclusion based on their “prior beliefs and expectancies” (Kunda, 1990, p. 480).  The 
motivations behind the decision makers’ actions may come from either the desire to be accurate 
(accurate conclusion) or the desire to achieve a goal (directional conclusion; Kunda, 1990).  In 
the case of financial statement fraud, both accurate conclusions and directional conclusions can 
cloud the judgement of the decision maker because financial statements must be accurate and are 
expected to meet goals (Murphy & Dacin, 2011).   
 While most research on the motivated reasoning theory as it relates to accounting focuses 
on auditors, Murphy and Dacin (2011) applied the motivated reasoning theory to fraudulent 
behavior.  Fraudsters rationalize their actions in order to rid themselves of guilt for doing the 
wrong thing (Dellaportas, 2013; Murphy & Dacin, 2011).  The motivated reasoning theory 
considers two of the three parts of the fraud triangle: pressure (motivation) and rationalization 
(reasoning).  According to Murphy and Dacin (2011), justification comes from a variety of 
sources including monetary rewards (improved standard of living), appearance of successfulness 
(improved social status), moral justification (it may be wrong but it will benefit more than it will 
hurt), and diffusion of responsibility (everyone does it; Murphy & Dacin, 2011). 
 Although fraud theory is a very broad subject, an understanding of the fraud triangle, 
accrual-specific fraud theories, agency theory, prospect theory, and motivated reasoning theory 
provides a framework to consult when assessing the likelihood of financial statement fraud.  
Rational choices cannot be expected when it comes to corporate governance (Marnet, 2007).  
The consideration of these theories will increase the efficiency of auditors, regulators, and 
stakeholders in the corporate governance process (Marnet, 2007). 
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 Accruals in accounting research.  This section of the literature review will visit the 
most significant studies that have used accruals in accounting research while the section that 
follows will focus specifically on using accruals to detect financial statement fraud.  This first 
section is a necessary addition to the literature review to show the importance of accruals in 
various accounting research studies. 
 Paul M. Healy (1985) conducted one of the most notable studies on accruals.  He 
evaluated the relationship between accrual policies of managers and their bonus contracts in 250 
of the largest U.S. industrial corporations.  Of the 250 corporations, 94 companies made it in to 
his sample because of their publicly disclosed bonus plan definitions.  His study found a “strong 
association between accruals and managers’ income-reporting incentives under their bonus 
contracts” (Healy, 1985, p. 106).  Healy’s work began a trend of accrual research regarding the 
incentives related to the manipulation of accruals and recent accrual researchers often cite his 
work.   
 Another research study of accruals investigated the relationship between cash flow, 
accruals, and stock prices and concluded that stock prices do not fully reflect all publicly 
available information due to accruals (Sloan, 1996).  Sloan (1996) evaluated over 40,000 firm-
year observations of financial statement and stock price data.  Using earnings, accruals, and cash 
flow from operations, his conclusions contradicted the traditional efficient market theory that 
stock prices are an efficient way to reflect all publicly available information (Sloan, 1996).  
Although a more recent study found that Sloan’s accrual anomaly may no longer be reliable in 
today’s market (Green, Hand, & Soliman, 2011), his study has continued to be cited in decades 
of accrual-related research because it can be applied to all publicly traded companies, not just 
those with a specific circumstance. 
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 Jones (1991) studied the use of earnings management by domestic producers involved in 
import-relief investigations by the U.S. International Trade Commission and found that 
managers used discretionary accruals to manipulate income during import relief investigations.  
The 23 firms studied were from five industries (automobiles, carbon steel, stainless and alloy 
tool steel, copper, and footwear) and were being investigated for acts such as antidumping, 
countervailing duty, and general escape clause damages.  Jones (1991) presented a total accruals 
model that accounts for changes in revenues, property/plant/equipment, and total assets.  Her 
model is often modified for specific research purposes (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995; 
Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005; Larcker & Richardson, 2004; McNichols, 2002).   
 Patricia M. Dechow has been a significant contributor to accrual research.  Beginning in 
1994, she studied earnings and cash flows as a measure of firm performance (Dechow, 1994).  
By measuring the relationship between earnings, stock prices, and cash flows, she concluded that 
accrual-based earnings “have a higher association with stock returns than do realized cash flows” 
because of the timing and matching problems involved with cash basis accounting (Dechow, 
1994, p. 35).  Her 1994 study demonstrates the importance of accrual accounting and explains 
why accrual-based earnings and expenses are reported to stakeholders rather than cash basis 
reports (Dechow, 1994).  In 2002, Dechow and Dichev investigated the quality of accruals based 
on how well they turned in to cash flows.  Their study found that firm characteristics (such as 
volatility, operating cycle, firm size, reported losses, and level of accruals) can be used to judge 
the quality of accruals and, in addition, connected Sloan’s 1996 study with Dechow’s earlier 
1994 study to conclude that “large accruals signify low quality earnings and less persistent 
earnings” (Dechow & Dichev, 2002, p. 54). 
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 Continuing on the foundation of accrual research provided by earlier scholars, Ayers et 
al. (2006) explored the relationship between discretionary accruals and earnings benchmarks.  
They found a direct relationship between discretionary accruals and earnings but could not 
conclude the reasons behind this relationship (Ayers et al., 2006).  Ghosh and Olsen (2009) 
looked at the use of discretionary accruals during periods of external uncertainty and found that 
managers use accruals to smooth earnings during periods of high external uncertainty; however, 
the factors that signal high uncertainty are hard to define (Ghosh & Olsen, 2009).  Their findings 
supplement Dechow’s (1994) study, previously mentioned, which evaluated uncertainty related 
to the firm’s internal environment (i.e., earnings and cash flows). 
 The relationship between accruals and cash flows was once again studied by Badertscher 
et al. (2012).  They examined managers’ motivations for using discretionary accruals including 
opportunistic reasons, informational reasons, and contractual reasons.  The “opportunistic” 
incentive involves using discretionary accruals to disguise poor economic performance of the 
firm.  The “informational” use of accruals occurs in order to prepare for the future activities of 
the firm.  In addition, the “contractual” use of accruals attempts to minimize the contracting costs 
in order to maximize firm value (Badertscher et al., 2012).  Their findings suggest that the ability 
of discretionary accruals to predict future cash flows varies depending on the motivation behind 
the use of the discretionary accruals.   
 Research by Foster and Shastri (2013) looked at the relationship between accruals 
(earnings management), material internal control weaknesses, and audit quality.  They suggested 
that auditors should extend the materiality threshold for firms with material internal control 
weaknesses when testing accruals in order to mitigate earnings management risks (Foster & 
Shastri, 2013).  Adding to the literature on accruals and audits, Lustgarten and Shon (2013) 
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examined how abnormal accruals may impact the life expectancy of an audit and found an 
indirect relationship – when firms make large abnormal accruals, audit engagement life 
expectancy decreases. 
 The most recent accrual research involves investment uncertainty (Arif, Marshall, & 
Yohn, 2016), stock price crashes (Zhu, 2016), and cash flow disclosures (Miao, Teoh, & Zhu, 
2016).  Research by Arif et al. (2016) evaluated the relationship among accruals, length of 
operating cycle, and firm uncertainty.  They found that accruals increase as uncertainty increases 
and is more evident for firms with longer operating cycles (Arif et al., 2016).  Zhu (2016) 
examined decades’ worth of financial information compared to stock price changes and found 
that “high accruals predict a higher price crash probability than low accruals” (p. 349).  One 
explanation of this relationship was found to be due to “managers’ use of income increasing 
accrual estimates to hoard bad news;” once the bad news is made public, the stock price crashes 
(Zhu, 2016, p. 349).  Miao et al. (2016) examined accruals, statement of cash flow disclosures, 
and investor sophistication.  He found a positive relationship between the thoroughness of the 
statement of cash flow disclosures and the efficient pricing of accruals by investors (Miao et al., 
2016).  In addition, less sophisticated investors need easily available cash flow disclosures for 
their evaluation of accruals (Miao et al., 2016). 
 This section has summarized the most notable and most recent accounting research using 
accruals.  Following the suggestion of Jones et al. (2008), the present study will add to the 
existing literature by considering the use of a revenue accruals quality ratio as an indicator of 
financial statement fraud.  An understanding of how accruals have been used in academic 
research in the past provides information that will help choose the most appropriate accruals ratio 
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for the present study.  Figure 3 summarizes all studies noted in this section of the literature 
review. 
 
Figure 3: Accruals in Accounting Research. 
 Accruals to detect financial statement fraud.  This literature review section is perhaps 
the most significant to this study as it summarizes the most relevant research that has tested 
accruals as an indicator of financial statement fraud.  The study of using accruals to detect 
financial statement fraud is not necessarily a new idea.  Two of the most significant accounting 
researchers on the topic of accruals are Patricia M. Dechow and Richard G. Sloan.    
 Dechow and Sloan partnered up to study the use of accruals to detect earnings 
management in perhaps the most notable research related to accruals and fraud (Dechow et al., 
1995).  Their study on detecting earnings management considered “five models of the process 
generating nondiscretionary accruals” (Dechow et al., 1995, p. 197).  The Healy, Deangelo, 
Jones, modified-Jones, and industry models were all tested with the results showing that the 
Jones model “provides the most powerful tests of earnings management” (Dechow et al., 1995, 
p. 223).  Because of their findings, a modified version of the Jones model is often the basis for 
accrual-related studies (Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari et al., 2005; Larcker & Richardson, 2004).   
Beneish (1999) presented a model to distinguish between fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
earnings management.  His model uses the following indexes: number of days’ sales in 
Researcher (s) Topic
Arif, Marshall, & Yohn (2016) Abnormal accruals and firm uncertainty
Ayers, Jiang, & Yeung (2006) Discretionary accruals and earnings targets
Badertscher, Collins, & Lys (2012) Discretionary accruals as a predictor of future cash flows
Dechow & Dichev (2002) The quality of accruals and earnings: The role of accrual estimation errors
Dechow (1994) Earnings and cash flows as a measure of firm performance: The role of accruals
Foster & Shastri (2013) Materiality of abnormal accruals and internal control weaknesses
Ghosh & Olsen (2009) Environmental uncertainty and discretionary accruals
Green, Hand, & Soliman (2011) The apparent demise of Sloan's accruals anomaly
Jones (1991) Earnings management during import relief investigations
Lustgarten & Shon (2013) Abnormal accruals and the life expectancy of audit engagements
Miao, Teoh, & Zhu (2016) Statement of Cash Flow disclosures and pricing of accruals
Sloan (1996) Do stock prices fully reflect information in accruals and cash flows about future earnings?
Zhu (2016) Accruals and stock price crashes
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receivables, gross margin, asset quality, selling/general/administrative expenses, sales growth, 
depreciation, leverage, and total accruals to total assets (Beneish, 1999).  His study found that 
earnings manipulation “generally consists of artificial inflation of revenues or deflation of 
expenses” and that the “primary characteristic of manipulators was that they had high growth 
prior to periods during which manipulation was in force” (Beneish, 1999, p. 34).  Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) continued with the topic by incorporating accrual estimation errors into the study 
of earnings management and found that “accrual quality is positively related to earnings 
persistence” (p. 54).   
 Seventeen years after their first consideration of this topic, Dechow and Sloan partnered 
up again to study the detection of earnings management and created a new approach that 
“simultaneously improves test power and specification” (Dechow et al., 2012, p. 276).  The new 
study considers the “inherent characteristics of accrual-based earnings,” particularly the fact that 
“accrual-based earnings management in one period must reverse in another period” (Dechow et 
al., 2012, p. 276).  Their study used the Healy model, the Jones model, the modified-Jones 
model, the Dechow and Dichev model, and the McNichols model and found that “accrual-based 
tests for earnings management can be significantly improved by incorporating accrual reversals” 
(Dechow et al., 2012, p. 331).  This approach should identify only the fraudulent accruals 
(amounts that do not reverse in subsequent periods).  Gerakos (2012) reviewed the new method 
presented by Dechow et al. (2012) and found that it is a great addition to the literature on using 
accruals to detect earnings manipulation by “introducing dynamics into the estimation of 
discretionary accruals” (p. 346).  However, he also raised several fundamental questions related 
to the identification of accrual reversals, properties of nondiscretionary accruals, and the 
dynamics of discretionary accruals. 
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 Jones et al. (2008) studied the relationship of accruals (earnings management) and 
financial statement fraud that was similar to that of the 1995 study by Dechow et al.  Using 118 
firms charged with fraud by the SEC as their sample, they tested several discretionary accrual 
models to determine their ability to detect earnings management fraud.  The models included the 
Jones model, the modified-Jones model, the modified-Jones model with book-to-market ratio 
and cash flows, the modified-Jones model with ROA, the Dechow/Dichev measure of accrual 
quality, the McNichols variation of Dechow/Dichev’s measure of accrual quality model, and the 
Beneish model.  Their study found that only two of the 10 models tested (Dechow/Dichev’s 
measure of accrual quality and McNichols variation of Dechow/Dichev’s measure of accrual 
quality) have “predictive power for both fraudulent and non-fraudulent restatement of earnings” 
(Jones et al., 2008, p. 529).  Their findings aid users of financial statements in understanding 
accrual-based earnings management as well as auditors and regulators who are tasked to uncover 
financial statement fraud. 
 Perols and Lougee (2011) added to the characteristics of fraudulent firms by finding a 
direct relationship between prior earnings management and financial statement fraud.  Through 
their investigation of 108 firms that had been issued SEC AAERs, they applied a formula of 
aggregated prior discretionary accruals and found that “firms that have previously managed 
earnings are more likely to commit fraud even when there is no evidence of earnings 
manipulation to meet or beat analyst forecasts or inflate revenue” (Perols & Lougee, 2011, p. 
52).  They suggested that future research is needed to provide direct evidence of the cause of this 
relationship.   
 Dechow et al. (2011) evaluated 676 fraudulent firms to develop a model to predict 
financial statement misstatements.  By using the cross-sectional modified Jones model, the 
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performance-matched discretionary accruals model, and the Dechow/Dichev model, they 
analyzed the firms’ accruals and found that poor accrual quality is a likely indicator of earnings 
manipulation.  Also identified as common characteristics of fraudulent firms are declining 
financial and nonfinancial firm performance, increasing cash sales, and increasing off-balance-
sheet financing (Dechow et al., 2011).  Their findings add to the literature on the characteristics 
of firms with fraudulent financial statements that aids regulators, auditors, and firm stakeholders 
in identifying fraud risks. 
 D’Amico and Mafrolla (2013) used the Jones model and three modified-Jones models to 
test accruals for a prediction of financial statement fraud and found that only one of the four 
models, Larcker and Richardson’s (2004) modified-Jones model, accurately predicted earnings 
management.  Their findings disagree with an earlier study by Dechow et al. (1995) that found 
the Jones model was a powerful predictor of financial statement fraud.  This contradiction in 
findings supports the need for more research in the area of accruals as an indicator of financial 
statement fraud.  Accruals were also found to be useful in the detection of financial statement 
fraud in a study by Kim et al. (2016).  In their evaluation of 40 different variables applied to 
nearly 800 datasets, those related to accrual quality proved the most useful in the detection of 
financial statement fraud (Kim et al., 2016). 
 
Figure 4:  Accruals to Detect Financial Statement Fraud. 
 
Researcher(s) Topic
D'Amico & Mafrolla (2013) Predicting financial statement fraud
Dechow & Dichev (2002) Accrual quality and estimation errors
Dechow, Ge, Larson, & Sloan (2011) Characteristics of firms who commit financial statement fraud
Dechow, Hutton, Kim & Sloan (2012) Detecting fraudulent earnings management
Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney (1995) Detecting earnings management
Gerakos (2012) Review of Dechow, et al. (2012) New Method of detecting earnings management
Jones, Krishnan, & Melendrez (2008) Discretionary accruals ratios to detect financial statement fraud
Kim, Baik, & Cho (2016) Multiple variables tested to predict financial misstatements with fraud intention
Perols & Lougee (2011) Prior earnings management and financial statement fraud
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 Research variables and accrual ratios.  This quantitative, correlational study examined 
the relationship between an accruals quality ratio and financial statement fraud.  This section 
discusses the accrual ratio variables previously used by researchers.  Chosen for discussion 
include accrual models by Jones (1991), Dechow et al. (1995), Sloan (1996), Beneish (1999), 
Dechow and Dichev (2002), Larcker and Richardson (2004), and Kothari et al. (2005). 
Jones’s (1991) study examined the use of earnings management during situations in 
which companies have an incentive to manipulate earnings, particularly during import relief 
investigations.  Her accruals model “relaxes the assumption that nondiscretionary accruals are 
constant and...attempts to control for the effect of changes in a firm's economic circumstances on 
nondiscretionary accruals” (Dechow et al., 1995).  The Jones model is as follows: 
TAt/At-1 = α[1/At-1] + β1[ΔREVt/At-1] + β2[PPEt/At-1] + et 
where: 
TAt = total accruals in year t = [∆Current Assets - ∆Cash] – [∆Current Liabilities  –  
Depreciation and Amortization Expense] 
ΔREVt = revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1; 
PPEt = gross property, plant, and equipment in year t; 
At-1 = total assets in year t-1; 
et = error term in year t (assumed to be 0) 
The Jones model assumes that revenues are nondiscretionary; therefore, the model removes the 
discretionary accruals from revenues.  Gross property, plant, and equipment (PPE) and change in 
revenue (REV) are part of the model to control for the nondiscretionary accrual changes due to 
varying economic conditions (Jones, 1991).  Total accruals (TA) includes changes in working 
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capital accounts (i.e., accounts receivables, inventory, and accounts payable) since they depend 
somewhat on changes in revenues (Jones, 1991). 
 A number of accrual-related studies adapt the Jones model to fit the objectives of each 
individual project (Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari et al., 2005; Larcker & Richardson, 2004; 
McNichols, 2002).  One example is the Dechow et al. (DSS; 1995) modified-Jones model.  The 
DSS modified-Jones model estimates discretionary accruals (instead of removing them) by 
assuming that changes in accounts receivable resulted from earnings management because it is 
easier to adjust earnings from credit sales than from cash sales (Dechow et al., 1995).  They 
found that their modified-Jones model was a better predictor of earnings management than other 
models (Dechow et al., 1995; Ghosh & Olsen, 2009).  The DSS modified-Jones model defines 
nondiscretionary accruals (NDA) as follows: 
NDAt = α1(1/At-1) + α2(ΔREVt - ∆RECt) + α3(PPEt) 
 where: 
 At-1 = total assets in year t-1; 
 ∆REVt = revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1; 
 ΔRECt = receivables in year t less receivables in year t-1; 
 PPEt = gross property, plant, and equipment in year t 
 Sloan (1996) conducted one of the earliest and most cited accrual-related studies.  He 
explored the accrual and cash flow components of financial statements and measured the extent 
to which they are reflected in stock prices (Sloan, 1996).  His study concluded that “firms with 
relatively high (low) levels of accruals experience negative (positive) future abnormal stock 
returns that are concentrated around future earnings announcements” (Sloan, 1996, p. 290).  His 
formula to calculate accruals is as follows: 
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TAt = (∆CAt - ∆Casht) – (ΔCLt - ∆STDt – ΔTPt) – Dept 
 where: 
 TA = total accruals 
 ∆CA = change in current assets 
 ∆Cash = change in cash/cash equivalents 
 ΔCL = change in current liabilities 
 ∆STD = change in debt included in current liabilities 
 ΔTP = change in income taxes payable 
 Dep = depreciation and amortization expense 
Sloan excluded debt in current liabilities (STD) because it relates to the financing instead of 
operating functions of the business.  In addition, taxes payable (TP) is subtracted because they 
are not a part of income from continuing operations as reported on the income statement (Sloan, 
1996).  Miao et al. (2016) recently used Sloan’s accrual model as part of their study of “the effect 
of statement of cash flows disclosure on the market’s ability to efficiently price the accrual 
component of reported earnings” (Miao et al., 2016, p. 510).  They found that including cash 
flow disclosures in the earnings announcements allows more investors (including the less 
sophisticated investors) to include accrual information into their decision making and valuing of 
the firm (Miao et al., 2016).  As it relates to this study, Sloan’s model is not as specific as the 
Jones model or the modified-Jones model because it does not account for discretionary accruals 
or the relationship of accounts receivable to accrued earnings. 
 Using variables based on Healy (1985) and Jones (1991), Beneish (1999) created an 
accrual model as part of his study to detect earnings management.  His total accrual to total 
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assets (TATA) model measures the extent to which cash backs reported earnings.  His accrual 
model is as follows: 
TATAt = [∆CAt – ΔCasht - ∆CLt – ΔCLTDt - ∆TPt – D&At] / TAt 
 where: 
 ∆CA = change in current assets 
 ΔCash = change in cash 
 ∆CL = change in current liabilities 
 ΔCLTD = change in current maturities of long-term debt 
 ∆TP = change in income tax payable 
 D&A = depreciation and amortization expense 
 TA = total assets 
 The TATA ratio is “often positive when revenue fraud is occurring” (Abassi et al., 2012, 
p. 1303).  In other words, higher accruals (less cash) signify an increased likelihood of earnings 
manipulation (Beneish, 1999).  After combining the results from all eight variables in his study, 
he concluded that TATA was one of the most important indices for companies that improperly 
recorded revenues through earnings management (Beneish, 1999; Roxas, 2011).  While 
discretionary accruals are not included in this model, his results “provide evidence of a 
systematic relationship between the likelihood of manipulation and selected financial statement 
data” (Jones et al., 2008). 
 Seven years after working with accruals and creating the DSS modified-Jones model, 
Dechow collaborated with Dichev to measure the quality of accruals (the extent to which 
accruals are eventually realized with cash flows).  The Dechow/Dichev accruals earnings quality 
metric recognizes that accruals should eventually match up with cash flows; therefore, 
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“nondiscretionary accruals should be negatively correlated with contemporaneous cash flows and 
positively correlated with adjacent cash flows” (Dechow et al., 2012).  The Dechow/Dichev 
model includes past, present, and future cash flow from operations (CFO) as variables (Dechow 
& Dichev, 2002; Dechow et al., 2012).  The DD model is stated as follows: 
ΔWCt = β0 + β1CFOt-1 + β2CFOt + β3CFOt+1 + et 
 where: 
 ΔWC = change in working capital 
 CFO = cash flow from operations 
 e = error term (assumed to be 0) 
 Their research concluded, “The standard deviation of the residuals is a firm-level 
measurement of accrual quality, where a higher standard deviation denotes lower quality” 
(Dechow & Dichev, 2002, p. 40).  The Dechow/Dichev model has been proven a useful model 
for measuring accrual quality related to timing difference between revenue recognition and cash 
flow (Jones et al., 2008; Dechow et al., 2012; Lustgarten & Shon, 2013).     
 Larcker and Richardson (2004) adapted Defond and Subramanyam’s (1998) modified-
Jones accrual model to include the book-to-market (BM) ratio (to represent the expected growth 
of the firm’s operations) and current cash flow from operations (CFO).  The Larcker and 
Richardson modified-Jones model is as follows: 
TAt = α + β1(ΔSalest – ΔRECt) + β2PPEt + β3BMt + β4CFOt + et 
 where: 
 TA = total accruals 
 ΔSales = change in sales from previous year to current year 
 ΔREC = the difference in accounts receivable from beginning of year to end 
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 PPE = end of year gross property, plant, and equipment 
 BM = ratio of common equity book value to common equity market value 
 CFO = cash flow from operations 
 e = error term (assumed to be 0) 
 Larcker and Richardson consider their modified-Jones model to be more accurate and 
useful than other accrual models because it “identifies unexpected accruals” and “identifies 
discretionary accruals that are associated with lower future earnings” (Jones et al., 2008, pp. 502-
503).  
 The final accrual ratio discussed in this review of the literature is the Kothari, Leone, and 
Wasley (KLW) modified-Jones model.  As with most accrual-related research, the KLW model 
is a modification of the Jones (1991) model.  Kothari et al. (2005) argued that firm performance 
is related to accruals; therefore, their calculation of total accruals includes return on assets 
(ROA) as a measure of performance.  The KLW performance-matched discretionary accruals 
modified-Jones model is as follows: 
TAt = β0 + β1(1/ATt-1) + β2(∆REVt – ΔARt) + β3PPEt + β4ROAt + et 
where:  
TA = total accruals 
AT = total assets 
∆REV = change in total sales from previous year to current year 
ΔAR = change in receivables from previous year to current year 
PPE = end of year gross property, plant, and equipment 
ROA = income before extraordinary items divided by previous year’s total assets 
e = error term (assumed to be 0) 
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 Kothari et al. (2005) experimented with both current year and prior-year ROA and found 
that current-year ROA predicted earnings management better than prior-year ROA.  Their 
research found that their KLW model enhanced the reliability of suggestions of earnings 
management (Jones et al., 2008).  However, they also noted that their research only tested for 
earnings management and their findings may not apply to other research situations such as fraud 
(Kothari et al., 2005; Jones et al., 2008).  In addition, a study by Dechow et al. (2011) found the 
KLW model has “less power to identify manipulation than unadjusted accrual measures” and 
suggest that controlling for things such as industry or performance (ROA) create significant 
estimation error into the discretionary accruals model when used to detect fraud (pp. 19-20).  For 
these reasons, the KLW model was not chosen as the accrual variable in the current study.  
Figure 5 summarizes the accrual models discussed in this section. 
 
Figure 5:  Accrual Models. 
 This quantitative, correlational study examined the relationship between accrual quality 
and financial statement fraud.  The accrual quality ratio chosen for this study was based on the 
model provided by Dechow and Dichev (2002).  This model was chosen because it recognized 
that accruals should eventually match-up with cash flows and considers past, present, and future 
cash flows.  The Dechow/Dichev model has proven to be a useful model for measuring accrual 
quality related to timing differences between revenue recognition and cash flows (Jones et al., 
2008; Dechow et al., 2012; Lustgarten & Shon, 2013).  The second variable for this study is the 
commitment of financial statement fraud.  The SEC issues AAERs against firms when there is 
Researcher(s) Accrual Model Description
Jones (1991) Controlled for changes in a firm's economic circumstances and removes nondiscretionary accruals
Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney (1995) Identified non-discretionary accruals
Sloan (1996) Measured the relationship between accruals and stock performance
Beneish (1999) Measured total assets to total accruals to predict financial statement fraud
Dechow & Dichev (2002) Measured accrual quality related to timing differences between revenue recognition and cash flow
Larcker & Richardson (2004) Included book-to-market ratio and current operations cash flow
Kothari, Leone, & Wasley (2005) Used ROA to predict earnings management
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strong evidence of accounting manipulation.  In general, firms that have been issued AAERs are 
very likely guilty of financial statement manipulation and have already restated their earnings, 
thereby admitting their guilt (Dechow et al., 2011).  
Transition and Summary 
 Various forms of research, including professional and academic literature, cover accruals 
and their use to detect financial statement fraud.  Professional literature relevant to this study 
includes the FASB’s ASU 2014-09 and Concept Statement No. 8, which provide authoritative 
guidance on accounting for revenue and accruals.  In addition, auditing standards and the SOX 
Act of 2002 provide fieldwork guidelines for auditors as they test for financial statement fraud.  
In particular, Auditing Standard 2110, SAS No. 99, AU§316.28, and various PCAOB regulations 
relate directly to the current study.  As stated in these guidelines, analytical procedures are 
commonly used as an audit testing procedure.  This study will add to the literature on using 
analytical procedures as an indicator of financial statement fraud. 
 Academic literature was reviewed in areas including financial statement fraud, accruals 
and earnings management, theoretical framework, accruals in accounting research, and using 
accruals to detect fraud.  Journal articles that focused on the detection of financial statement 
fraud and, more specifically, using accruals to detect financial statement fraud were reviewed.  
Accrual formulas that have previously been used in the study of financial statement fraud were 
exhaustively reviewed and considered in the planning for the current study. 
 Research has indicated that there is a need for additional analytical indicators of financial 
statement fraud (Abassi et al., 2012; Bolton & Hand, 2002; Golden et al., 2013; Kassem & 
Higson, 2012; McMahon et al., 2016; Bian et al., 2016).  This study will add to the literature on 
the topic and help auditors, creditors, investors, and other stakeholders in their analysis of 
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financial statements.  The next section of this applied doctoral research project discusses the role 
of the researcher, the participants, the research method and design, the population and sampling, 
the data collection, the data analysis, and the reliability/validity of the study. 
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Section 2: The Project 
 This section provides information on the research method and design of this applied 
doctoral research project.  Items included are: (a) purpose statement, (b) role of the researcher, 
(c) participants, (d) research method and design, (e) population sampling, (f) data collection, (g) 
data analysis, and (h) reliability and validity. 
Purpose Statement 
 The purpose of this quantitative, correlational study was to examine the relationship 
between accrual quality and financial statement fraud.  Prior research found that companies with 
excessive accruals are more likely to produce fraudulent financial statements (Perols & Lougee, 
2011).  Although most companies will have revenue accruals as a normal part of business, this 
study attempted to determine if an accruals ratio may be an appropriate detection measure for the 
likelihood of financial statement fraud. 
Role of the Researcher 
 In this quantitative, correlational study, the researcher collected and analyzed publicly 
available archival data in order to address the research question regarding revenue accruals and 
financial statement fraud.  Unlike a qualitative study where the researcher is an instrument in the 
study, there was no relationship with the participants.  The researcher interpreted the results of 
the statistical analysis and applied the findings to the hypotheses of this dissertation. 
Participants 
 This research did not use any live subjects, only archival data.  Data gathered were 
obtained from the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Releases (AAER), a publicly available database.  AAERs are actions taken against 
firms that have strong evidence of accounting manipulation (Dechow et al., 2011) and are often 
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used in financial statement fraud research.  Information needed for this study was collected from 
financial statements available through S&P Capital IQ NetAdvantage, company websites, or the 
publicly available SEC database.  No confidential or personal information was collected for this 
study.   
Research Method and Design 
 This section covers the research method and design of this study.  First, the applicability 
of the quantitative research method to this study is discussed.  Next, explanation as to why the 
qualitative method and mixed-method approaches are not ideal for this study is provided.  
Finally, the correlational design is addressed as the most appropriate design with a further 
discussion on why other research designs were not conducive for this study. 
Method 
 The quantitative method was chosen for this project because it involves the use of 
statistically analyzed data to determine the relationship between variables (Creswell, 2014).  The 
quantitative method is very useful in accounting research as a way to interpret data for practical 
use (Richardson, 2015).  Quantitative research is appropriate for this study because the 
theoretical framework is based on positive accounting theory, which includes the analysis of 
archival data (Kabir, 2010).  Statistical analysis will determine if there is a relationship between 
the variables and, if so, to what extent (Stake, 2010).  Many researchers in the fields of 
accounting and financial statement analysis have used the quantitative method to measure the 
relationship among variables with archival data that has been directly observed and evaluated 
(Abassi et al., 2012).   
 Other research methods such as qualitative and mixed-method were not appropriate 
because of the scope and intention of this study.  Qualitative studies are subjective and 
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situational (Stake, 2010) while this study involves the analysis of numerous instances of financial 
statement fraud.  The mixed method is a combination of qualitative and quantitative and is not 
appropriate because this study is searching for a statistical relationship among variables 
(Creswell, 2014).   
Design 
 A correlational design was used to determine if a relationship exists between the accrual 
quality and financial statement fraud.  A correlational design fits the purpose of this study 
because it describes the nature and magnitude of the relationship between the variables (Salkind, 
2010).  Comparing the accrual quality of companies with financial statement fraud to the accrual 
quality of companies without financial statement fraud will determine if a statistically significant 
relationship exists between these variables.  Other quantitative designs that were not chosen 
include the experimental and descriptive designs.   
 The experimental and quasi-experimental designs of quantitative research are not 
appropriate for this study because there is no intervention with pre-tests and post-tests (Edmonds 
& Kennedy, 2017).  These designs call for independent, dependent, and control variables as well 
as a control procedure with the intention of identifying a cause and effect relationship (Salkind, 
2010).  This study compares historical data from financial statements with no new intervention 
or procedure to the data.   
 The descriptive design is used to explore a phenomenon and “describe what exists with 
respect to the individual, group, or condition” (Edmonds & Kennedy, 2017, p. 161).  Generally, 
with a descriptive design, a survey is administered to a random sample of a population or, if 
feasible, an entire population (Edmonds & Kennedy, 2017).  Surveys are used to “observe trends, 
attitudes, or opinions of the population of interest” (Edmonds & Kennedy, 2017, p. 133).  This 
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study compares historical data (retrospective analysis) to determine the relationship between 
variables.  Therefore, the descriptive approach is not appropriate to address the research question 
or test the hypothesis of this study. 
 Variables.  The dependent variable for this study is commitment of financial statement 
fraud.  The SEC issues AAERs against firms when there is strong evidence of accounting 
manipulation.  In general, firms that have been issued AAERs are very likely guilty of financial 
statement manipulation and have already restated their earnings, thereby admitting their guilt 
(Dechow et al., 2011).  As discussed in the following section regarding the population of the 
study, AAERs are commonly used in accounting fraud research. 
 The independent variable chosen for this study is accrual quality based on the model 
provided by Dechow and Dichev (2002).  Dechow and Dichev created this model to measure 
accrual quality and used the Pearson correlation to test it against existing theory in the areas of 
firm operating cycle, firm size, sales volatility, cash flow volatility, accrual volatility, earnings 
volatility, frequency of negative earnings, and magnitude of accruals.  Furthermore, they 
suggested that their accrual quality model could be tested to predict other applications of 
earnings management, such as “accruals manipulated by management” (Dechow & Dichev, 
2002, p. 46) which is the objective of this study.   
 The Dechow/Dichev 2002 model was chosen because it recognizes that accruals should 
eventually match-up with cash flows and considers past, present, and future cash flows.  This 
model has been proven a useful model for measuring accrual quality related to timing differences 
between revenue recognition and cash flows (Jones et al., 2008; Dechow et al., 2012; Lustgarten 
& Shon, 2013).  For this study, an independent t-test was used to determine if there is a 
statistically significant difference between the non-fraud standardized residuals and the 
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fraudulent standardized residuals taken as two separate groups.  Results from this analysis 
address the research question and research hypotheses. 
Population and Sampling 
 The SEC has been issuing AAERs since 1982 during or at the conclusion of an 
investigation against an individual or entity for accounting misconduct (Dechow et al., 2011; Shi 
et al., 2016).  The SEC issues AAERs when there is strong evidence or admitted accounting 
manipulation.  Many accounting researchers rely on the AAER data to identify companies that 
have committed financial statement fraud (Beneish, 1999; Dechow et al., 2011; Dechow et al., 
2012; Jones et al., 2008; Perols & Lougee, 2011; Roxas, 2011; Shi et al., 2016).  The population 
for this study consisted of firms that have been issued AAERs by the SEC for fraudulently 
misstating their financial statements during the years 2015 and 2016.  These two years were 
chosen because they contain the most recent data available.     
 Purposive, criterion sampling was used to select the sample for this study.  Purposive 
sampling is used when the researcher selects participants based on a “specific need or purpose” 
such as commitment of financial statement fraud (Edmonds & Kennedy, 2017, p. 20).  
Consistent with prior research (Beneish, 1999; Dechow et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2008), the 
following AAERs were disregarded from the population of the study:  (a) individuals, accounting 
firms, and government/municipal agencies that were issued AAERs; (b) firms that were issued 
AAERs for violations under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977; (c) AAERs that were 
issued against quarterly data rather than yearly data; and (d) firms that were public companies.  
Removing these AAERs from the population leaves only those that were issued to companies for 
financial statement fraud for a fiscal year.    
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 After applying these exclusion criteria to the 222 AAERs issued in 2015 and 2016, 
seventeen firms remained.  Data were collected from 100% of the eligible companies in the 
sample.  For each of the 17 fraudulent companies chosen for the study, a non-fraudulent 
company was chosen for the non-fraud group based on the following inclusion criteria: (a) 
similar in revenue size or market capitalization, (b) same industry (based on SIC industry code), 
and (c) same fraud year as that of the fraudulent firms.  Therefore, 34 companies made up the 
sample in this study.  Most of the companies were issued AAERs for more than one year 
resulting in 40 firm-years evaluated for each group.  The Dechow/Dichev accruals quality model 
chosen as the independent variable for this study requires each observation to have prior-year, 
current-year, and subsequent-year information.  Therefore, 240 firm-year observations make up 
the sample in the study.      
Data Collection 
Instruments 
 No specific data-gathering instruments were used in this study.  The data used were 
collected from publicly available historical data (the SEC’s EDGAR database) as well as the 
subscription-based website S&P Capital IQ NetAdvantage.  The raw data were downloaded and 
entered into IBM SPSS 24 Software to perform statistical analysis.  A list of all raw data may be 
obtained by contacting the researcher. 
Data Collection Technique 
 Fraudulent financial statements were identified through the SEC’s 2015 and 2016 AAER 
archives.  While the SEC issues AAERs for companies, individuals, accounting firms, and 
governmental/municipal agencies, purposive sampling was applied to the population leaving 
only public companies with fraudulent financial statement activity in the sample.  The researcher 
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identified 17 fraudulent companies and 17 non-fraudulent companies as meeting the criteria for 
this study and downloaded their data for the fraud year(s) into IBM SPSS 24 for statistical 
analysis.  The data used in the analysis were limited to what were obtained from the SEC 
EDGAR database and the S&P Capital IQ NetAdvantage database.   
Data Organization Techniques 
 Data collected during this study were downloaded from the S&P Capital IQ 
NetAdvantage software and/or the SEC EDGAR database to IBM SPSS 24.  As recommended 
by Stake (2010), working papers detailing the selection of the participants were also kept by the 
researcher.  The working papers acted as a reflective journal detailing the specific characteristics 
of the firms chosen for the study as well as those excluded from the study.  In addition, details of 
the characteristics and reasoning behind the choices for the non-fraudulent companies were also 
included in the reflective journal.  The IBM SPSS 24 document was stored on a cloud server 
(Microsoft OneDrive) and was backed up on a hard drive.  The working papers were kept in the 
researcher’s locked office. 
 Data were organized in IBM SPSS 24 to prepare for the statistical analysis.  Relevant 
company data were entered for each of the 40 fraudulent firm years as well as the 40 
nonfraudulent firm years.  This data included change in working capital for the current (fraud) 
year (ΔWCt), prior period cash flow from operations (CFOt-1), current period cash flow from 
operations (CFOt), and future period cash flow from operations (CFOt+1).  As required by the 
Dechow/Dichev model, the period for the collected data were the year of, the year before, and 
the year after the fraudulent activity.  Although the AAERs used were those issued in 2015 and 
2016, the related fraudulent activity was perpetrated in years ranging from 2008-2013. 
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Data Analysis Technique 
 The chosen data analysis techniques tested the difference in the revenue accruals quality 
for companies with detected financial statement fraud and similar companies without detected 
financial statement fraud.  After the financial statement data for each company was organized 
into IBM SPSS 24, a regression analysis was applied to the non-fraudulent company data to 
determine the coefficients for the accrual quality formula that would provide the best fit.  ΔWCt 
= Intercept + b0 * CFOt-1 + b1 * CFOt + b2 * CFOt+1.  Next, the best fit regression coefficients 
from the non-fraud companies were applied to both the fraudulent and non-fraudulent company 
data to project an estimate for the change in working capital.  Intercept + b0 * CFOt-1 + b1 * 
CFOt + b2 * CFOt+1 = projected ΔWCt .  Per the Dechow/Dichev accrual quality model, the 
residual (the difference between the projected change in working capital and the actual change in 
working capital) determines the quality of accruals.  The method determines that a high standard 
deviation of residuals indicates lower quality accruals and a low standard deviation of residuals 
indicates higher quality accruals (Dechow & Dichev, 2002).  Therefore, additional columns were 
used to calculate the residual data for the fraudulent and non-fraudulent company data. 
Because of the varying sizes of companies in the sample, the residuals of all companies 
were then standardized in units of standard deviations based upon the variance of both groups 
taken together (Salkind, 2013; see Figures 7 & 8).  The Dechow/Dichev method states the 
magnitude of the deviation, rather than the direction is significant (Dechow & Dichev, 2002); 
therefore, the absolute value of the standardized residuals were generated.  In order to test H1, a 
difference analysis was conducted using an independent t-test to determine if there is a 
statistically significant difference between the non-fraud standardized residuals and the 
fraudulent standardized residuals taken as two separate groups. 
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Reliability and Validity 
 Issues with reliability and validity are concerns in all research studies (Edmonds & 
Kennedy, 2017; Creswell, 2014).  Reliability refers to the consistency of the researcher’s 
approach compared to different researchers and studies (Gibbs, 2008) while validity is the 
“extent to which the outcome accurately answer the stated research question(s) of the study” and 
“measures what it is developed to measure” including the hypothesis presented in the study 
(Edmonds & Kennedy, 2017, p. 4).  The type of research and the instruments used in the study 
will determine the specific threats to reliability and validity.  The reliability and validity of this 
study is discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Reliability 
 In quantitative research, reliability refers to the accuracy of the data collected and the 
ability of the results to be replicated (Creswell, 2014).  The test-retest correlation and internal 
consistency are two forms of determining reliability (Creswell, 2014).  The use of statistical 
analysis to test for financial statement fraud is a common practice in accounting research (Bolton 
& Hand, 2002; Dechow et al., 2012; Gupta & Gill, 2012; Perols & Lougee, 2011) and should be 
easily replicated (test-retest).  This study did not involve any specific instruments for gathering 
data (i.e., survey).  All information was collected from public databases (i.e., SEC EDGAR and 
company websites) or subscription-based services (i.e., S&P Capital IQ NetAdvantage).  When 
available, the researcher compared the data to other sources to verify the information and make 
the results of this study more reliable. 
 The use of commercial and/or public databases is common practice in accounting 
research (Karpoff, Koester, Lee, & Martin, 2014).  In particular, SEC AAERs are often used 
when researching financial statement fraud as these are issued with evidence or admittance of 
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financial irregularities (Beneish, 1999; Dechow et al., 2011; Dechow et al., 2012; Jones et al., 
2008; Perols & Lougee, 2011; Roxas, 2011).  While there is a chance of publicly available 
archival data being inaccurate (Karpoff et al., 2014), the use of data from a federally regulated 
agency (SEC) reduces the likelihood of incorrect data.  In addition, subscription-based services, 
such as the S&P Capital IQ NetAdvantage software, have a profit incentive to keep their data 
accurate. 
 Richardson (2015) studied the use of qualitative and quantitative methods in accounting 
research and mentioned the use of commercial and/or public databases in his discussion.  He 
stated that researchers that rely on archival data should do so with a “critical perspective” (p. 73).  
All data used in this study were collected from archival data sources and were, when possible, 
verified with other third-party sources such as the companies’ websites.  The research questions 
in this study are suitable for archival data due to the abundance of financial information analyzed 
and the implied reliability of federally regulated and subscription-based sources.   
Validity 
 Quantitative research validity refers to the ability to draw “meaningful and useful 
inferences” from the results of the study (Creswell, 2014, p. 160).  It is impossible to design a 
study that is free of any threat to validity (Creswell, 2014); however, the use of archival data 
reduces validity threats that are present in other research designs (Smith, 2003).  When 
conducting quantitative research, Creswell (2014) suggested establishing content validity, 
predictive validity, and construct validity.   
 Content validity refers to whether or not the study measures the content it was intended to 
measure.  Prior to choosing the specific accrual quality model that would be used as the variable 
in this study, significant research was conducted to evaluate the most common models used in 
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financial statement fraud research.  The researcher chose the Dechow/Dichev model for this 
study because of its applicability and historical accuracy in other fraud research studies.  For 
example, Jones et al. (2008) found of the 10 measures of earnings management they examined, 
the Dechow/Dichev model and a modified Dechow/Dichev model were the only two that had 
“predictive power for both fraudulent and non-fraudulent restatements of earnings” (p. 529).  In 
addition, Lustgarten and Shon (2013) used the Dechow/Dichev model to compare accrual quality 
with life expectancy of audit engagements.  The many uses of this model to test a variety of firm 
characteristics made it an optimal choice for this study that will test yet another firm 
characteristic: commitment of financial statement fraud. 
 Predictive validity refers to the re-testing ability of the measure and whether or not the 
same results would be concluded.  The use of publicly available company data strengthens the 
predictive validity of the study and the small sample size creates an easily replicated study.  
Construct validity refers to the usefulness of the findings in practice.  This study will add to the 
literature on financial statement fraud identification techniques and should prove useful in 
practice for many different stakeholders.   
Transition and Summary 
 This quantitative, correlational study examined the relationship between accruals quality 
and financial statement fraud.  The research method and design were chosen to address the 
specific research question in this study.  The accruals quality model variable was chosen due to 
its applicability to the research question and its historical accuracy in other accounting research 
studies.  All reasonable steps were taken to mitigate reliability and validity threats that are part of 
any similar research.  Section 3 will discuss the findings of this study and its application to 
professional practice.  
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Section 3: Applications to Professional Practice and Implications for Change 
Overview of Study 
 This study was conducted to address the need for additional financial statement fraud 
detection techniques.  Accrual quality was chosen as the focus of this study due to the high 
likelihood of financial statement manipulation using accruals (Dechow et al., 2011; Mangala & 
Kumari, 2015; Perols & Lougee, 2011).  Using the Dechow/Dichev accrual quality model, this 
study examined the relationship between accrual quality and financial statement fraud to 
determine whether accrual quality may be used as an indicator of financial statement fraud.   
 Data were collected from SEC AAERs issued in 2015 and 2016.  Using purposive, 
criterion sampling, fraudulent companies were chosen from the AAERs and similar, non-
fraudulent companies were chosen for the non-fraud group.  The Dechow/Dichev model was 
applied to the data to compare the accrual quality for each group.  Then, the standardized 
residuals produced for each group by the Dechow/Dichev model were used as the variables for 
the analysis.  In order to test H1, a difference analysis was conducted using an independent t-test 
to determine if there is a statistically significant difference between the non-fraud standardized 
residuals and the fraudulent standardized residuals taken as two separate groups. 
Presentation of Findings 
 The purpose of this quantitative, correlational study was to examine the relationship 
between accrual quality and financial statement fraud.  Prior research found that companies with 
excessive accruals are more likely to produce fraudulent financial statements (Perols & Lougee, 
2011).  While this study does not measure accrual size, it does measure the quality of the 
accruals based on the recognition of accrued revenue in subsequent cash flows.  Dechow and 
Dichev’s (2002) accrual quality model was used as the foundation of the analysis for this study: 
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ΔWCt = Intercept + b0 * CFOt-1 + b1 * CFOt + b2 * CFOt+1.  Their formula takes into 
consideration the changes in working capital (ΔWCt), prior period cash flow from operations 
(CFOt-1), current period cash flow from operations (CFOt), and future period cash flow from 
operations (CFOt+1).  Their method determined that “the standard deviation of the residuals is a 
firm-level measure of accrual quality, where a higher standard deviation denotes lower quality” 
(Dechow & Dichev, 2002, p. 40).  Their formula was found to be an accurate indicator of accrual 
quality and has been used in many subsequent studies (Jones et al., 2008; Dechow et al., 2012; 
Lustgarten & Shon, 2013).  This study takes the Dechow/Dichev model, applies it to the data, 
calculates the standard deviation of the residuals, and applies a difference analysis using an 
independent t-test to determine if there is a statistically significant difference between the non-
fraud standardized residuals and the fraudulent standardized residuals taken as two separate 
groups. 
 The sample was gathered from public companies that had been issued an AAER by the 
SEC in 2015 or 2016 for misstating financial statements.  Two hundred and twenty-two AAERS 
were issued in 2015 and 2016.  Of the 222 issued, 190 were excluded due to violations of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), accounting professional violations, and other non-
financial statement related infractions.  Of the remaining 32 companies, 15 were excluded based 
on no subsequent data, misstatement of quarterly data (rather than annual data), or no similar 
public company available for the non-fraud group.  Once the final group of 17 fraud companies 
was identified, similar non-fraud companies were chosen.  Inclusion criteria used to identify 
similar, non-fraud companies included revenue size, market capitalization, SIC industry codes, 
and public company status.  In total, 17 fraud and 17 non-fraud companies made up the final 
sample and 100% of these companies were included in the study.  Since companies were issued 
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AAERs for fraud during multiple years, 80 firm year observations were included in this study 
(40 in the fraud group and the same 40 firm years in the non-fraud group). 
 All statistical tests and analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS version 24.  The 
financial statement data were collected using the S&P Capital IQ NetAdvantage database.   
The change in working capital (ΔWC) and cash flow from operations for the three years needed 
for the Dechow/Dichev formula (CFOt-1, CFOt, and CFOt+1) were collected from each 
company’s financial reports (Form 10-K).  The raw data for the fraud group and the non-fraud 
group are provided in the Appendices.   
 Using the Dechow/Dichev model, a regression analysis was applied to the non-fraudulent 
company data to determine the coefficients for the accrual quality formula that would provide the 
best fit.  ΔWCt = Intercept + b0 * CFOt-1 + b1 * CFOt + b2 * CFOt+1.  
  Coefficients 
Intercept -178753.6323 
CFOt-1 1.500574794 
CFOt -1.048344296 
CFOt+1 0.242082647 
Figure 6: Coefficients. 
Once the best fit regressions coefficients were identified, they were applied to both the 
fraudulent and non-fraudulent company data to project an estimate for the change in working 
capital: 
ΔWCt = -178753.6323 + (1.500574794)CFOt-1 + (-1.048344296)CFOt + (0.242082647)CFOt+1  
 Figures 7 and 8 show the results after the application of the Dechow/Dichev formula on 
the separate group data.  The column titled ΔWCt lists the actual change in working capital for 
the fraud year and the residuals column shows the difference in estimated ΔWCt and actual 
ΔWCt.  Following the Dechow/Dichev procedures for determining accrual quality, the standard 
deviation of the residuals was calculated (see Figure 9). 
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Due to the varying sizes of companies in the sample, the residuals of all companies were 
standardized in units of standard deviations based upon the variance of both groups taken 
together (Salkind, 2013).  The Dechow/Dichev method states the magnitude of the deviation, 
rather than the direction is significant (Dechow & Dichev, 2002), therefore, the absolute value of 
the standardized residuals were generated.     
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           Figure 7:  Fraud Group Residuals (in thousands). 
FRADULENT COMPANIES
(in thousands)
Company Name  ∆WC t RESIDUALS
ABS 
Standardized 
Residual
Computer Sciences Corp. FY2009 (885,000) (1,037,248) 1.442
Computer Sciences Corp. FY2010 (418,000) (1,875,575) 2.608
Computer Sciences Corp. FY2011 (426,000) (1,357,769) 1.888
FNCB Bancorp, Inc. FY2009 (12,433) 151,907 0.211
General Cable Corporation FY2008 (155,100) (215,789) 0.300
General Cable Corporation FY2009 346,600 729,890 1.015
General Cable Corporation FY2010 (144,200) (705,084) 0.980
General Cable Corporation FY2011 (141,300) (78,814) 0.110
IEC Electronics Corp. FY2012 (4,763) 169,421 0.236
INTL FCStone, Inc. FY2010 91,700 312,211 0.434
INTL FCStone, Inc. FY2011 155,400 405,988 0.565
INTL FCStone, Inc. FY2012 23,200 (219,089) 0.305
Keybanc Capital Markets, Inc. FY2010 1,116,000 211,574 0.294
Logitech International FY2012 1,555 122,409 0.170
Logitech International FY2013 21,454 (21,201) 0.029
Miller Energy Resources, Inc. FY 2010 202,219 379,418 0.528
ModusLink Global Solutions FY2007 12,197 222,560 0.309
ModusLink Global Solutions FY2008 (43,141) 41,869 0.058
ModusLink Global Solutions FY2009 18,105 233,269 0.324
ModusLink Global Solutions FY2010 371 169,106 0.235
ModusLink Global Solutions FY2011 (16,389) 100,745 0.140
Monsanto Company FY2009 (1,240,000) (3,255,689) 4.527
Monsanto Company FY2010 (702,000) (3,094,167) 4.303
Monsanto Company FY2011 280,000 572,397 0.796
Orrstown Financial Services, Inc. FY2010 1,893 179,442 0.250
Orrstown Financial Services, Inc. FY2011 3,165 176,716 0.246
Park National Corporation FY2010 (8,794) 162,964 0.227
Powersecure International, Inc. FY2012 4,116 202,995 0.282
Powersecure International, Inc. FY2013 (14,457) 142,825 0.199
Powersecure International, Inc. FY2014 8,003 202,470 0.282
St. Joe Company FY2009 (23,167) 132,109 0.184
St. Joe Company FY2010 52,607 174,711 0.243
Stein Mart, Inc. FY2010 40,515 281,291 0.391
Stein Mart, Inc. FY2011 (18,537) 50,278 0.070
The Phoenix Companies FY2010 (515,800) 300,820 0.418
The Phoenix Companies FY2011 (263,800) 283,088 0.394
Weatherford International FY2007 (863,599) (1,668,709) 2.320
Weatherford International FY2008 (949,153) (1,070,409) 1.488
Weatherford International FY2009 (515,715) (1,623,497) 2.258
Weatherford International FY2010 (182,000) 55,795 0.078
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                     Figure 8:  Non-Fraud Group Residuals (in thousands). 
 
NON-FRAUDULENT COMPANIES
(in thousands)
Company Name ∆WC t RESIDUALS
ABS 
Standardized 
Residuals
Harris Corp. FY2009 (14,700) (164,799) 0.229
Harris Corp. FY2010 46,600 (135,403) 0.188
Harris Corp. FY2011 (49,200) (408,054) 0.567
First Farmers & Merchants Corp. FY2009 (14,848) 141,937 0.197
Mueller Industries FY2008 60,231 136,118 0.189
Mueller Industries FY2009 (7,737) (40,244) 0.056
Mueller Industries FY2010 (56,279) 28,210 0.039
Mueller Industries FY2011 21,393 250,544 0.348
Nortech Systems, Inc. FY2012 2,095 186,939 0.260
Principal Financial Group, Inc. FY2010 1,464,800 547,584 0.761
Principal Financial Group, Inc. FY2011 1,482,600 (428,110) 0.595
Principal Financial Group, Inc. FY2012 2,054,600 853,974 1.188
M&T Bank Corporation FY2010 274,376 (4,013) 0.006
Teradata Corporation FY2012 (53,000) (164,705) 0.229
Teradata Corporation FY2013 (99,000) (413,037) 0.574
PrimeEnergy Corporation FY2010 15,368 198,223 0.276
TESSCO Technologies FY2007 15,325 217,474 0.302
TESSCO Technologies FY2008 (7,473) 129,918 0.181
TESSCO Technologies FY2009 3,618 188,432 0.262
TESSCO Technologies FY2010 (2,772) 165,852 0.231
TESSCO Technologies FY2011 (3,625) 160,259 0.223
Icahn Enterprises FY2009 740,000 (48,539) 0.067
Icahn Enterprises FY2010 1,137,000 328,071 0.456
Icahn Enterprises FY2011 (3,106,000) (1,263,836) 1.757
Citizens & Northern Corp. FY 2010 9,322 196,287 0.273
Citizens & Northern Corp. FY 2011 4,672 163,418 0.227
NBT Bancorp, Inc. FY2010 9,272 179,451 0.250
Atlantic Power Corporation FY2012 2,700 235,856 0.328
Atlantic Power Corporation FY2013 47,100 119,140 0.166
Atlantic Power Corporation FY2014 (18,600) (21,550) 0.030
The InterGroup Corp. FY2009 3,379 183,489 0.255
The InterGroup Corp. FY2010 (2,947) 170,496 0.237
Stage Stores, Inc. FY2010 (37,869) 22,155 0.031
Stage Stores, Inc. FY2011 (33,913) 91,418 0.127
Primerica, Inc. FY2010 (116,062) (990,307) 1.377
Primerica, Inc. FY2011 22,813 202,344 0.281
KBR, Inc. FY2007 190,000 (798,310) 1.110
KBR, Inc. FY2008 (320,000) (374,679) 0.521
KBR, Inc. FY2009 (495,000) (672,961) 0.936
KBR, Inc. FY2010 180,000 830,962 1.156
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 The research question and hypotheses for this study were as follows: 
 Q1:  To what extent does the revenue accruals quality differ for public companies with 
detected financial statement fraud compared to public companies with no detected financial 
statement fraud? 
H10:  There is no statistically significant difference in the revenue accruals quality ratio 
for companies with detected financial statement fraud and similar companies without 
detected financial statement fraud. 
H1a:  There is a statistically significant difference in the revenue accruals quality ratio for 
companies with detected financial statement fraud and similar companies without 
detected financial statement fraud. 
Dechow/Dichev Model of Accrual Quality Results 
 The application of the Dechow/Dichev to each group provided the following results: 
 
Std Deviation 
of Residuals 
FRAUD group 923,568 
NON-FRAUD group 418,862 
           Figure 9:  Standard Deviation Summary. 
 These numbers indicate the residuals for the fraud group are much more volatile than the 
residuals for the non-fraud group.  The Dechow/Dichev model measures accrual quality related 
to timing differences between revenue recognition and cash flows (Jones et al., 2008; Dechow et 
al., 2012; Lustgarten & Shon, 2013).  Their research concluded, “The standard deviation of the 
residuals is a firm-level measure of accrual quality, where a higher standard deviation denotes 
lower quality” (Dechow & Dichev, 2002, p. 40).  Therefore, the research question can be 
answered by stating that the revenue accruals for the fraud group are lower quality than the 
revenue accruals for the non-fraud group based on the Dechow/Dichev model.  These findings 
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indicated that there is a relationship between accrual quality for the fraud companies and the 
non-fraud companies; therefore, additional testing is warranted.  
Descriptive Statistics 
 Before conducting the independent t-test, descriptive statistics were created to determine 
the quality and characteristics of the data.    
Fraud Data 
 
Non-Fraud Data 
Mean 0.778 
 
Mean 0.412 
Median 0.302 
 
Median 0.258 
Standard Deviation 1.074 
 
Standard Deviation 0.406 
Sample Variance 1.153 
 
Sample Variance 0.165 
Kurtosis 5.261 
 
Kurtosis 2.565 
Skewness 2.326 
 
Skewness 1.728 
Range 4.498 
 
Range 1.752 
Minimum 0.029 
 
Minimum 0.006 
Maximum 4.527 
 
Maximum 1.757 
Count 40.000 
 
Count 40.000 
            Figure 10:  Descriptive Statistics for each Data Set. 
 
     Figure 11:  Fraud Data Frequency Distribution. 
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    Figure 12:  Non-Fraud Data Frequency Distribution. 
 
 Of particular interest in the descriptive statistics is the standard deviation of each group 
and the range of the two groups.  The standard deviation of the fraudulent data is 1.074 while the 
standard deviation of the non-fraudulent data is 0.406.  In addition, the range of the fraudulent 
data is 0.029 to 4.527.  Since the data are standardized, values higher than three are considered 
very unusual and values higher than four are considered extreme outliers (Salkind, 2013).  
Notice, however, that the non-fraud group did not have any value higher than 1.757.  The 
following analysis will verify this preliminary assumption that these groups are distinctly 
different. 
T-test Results  
 An independent t-test was conducted to compare the fraud group standardized residuals 
to the non-fraud group standardized residuals.  Because the absolute value of the standardized 
residuals was used, a 1-tailed t-test was appropriate.  There was a significant difference in the 
scores for the fraud group (M=0.778, SD=1.074) and the non-fraud group (M=0.412, SD=0.406) 
conditions; t (78) = 2.017, p = 0.245.  In other words, the difference in accrual quality for 
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fraudulent and non-fraudulent firms is statistically significant.  Therefore, applying these results, 
H10 can be rejected. 
Summary of Findings 
 The use of the Dechow/Dichev model provided insight into the usefulness of using 
accruals as an indicator of financial statement fraud by comparing the standard deviation of the 
residuals.  The fraud group’s standard deviation of the residuals was higher than the non-fraud 
group’s standard deviation of the residuals indicating low quality accruals for the fraud group 
data.  The t-test results concluded that there is a statistically significant difference between the 
accrual quality of the non-fraud group and the accrual quality of the fraud group.  Therefore, 
applying these results, H10 can be rejected.  
Applications to Professional Practice 
 Accruals have been found to be high in years of fraudulent financial statements (Dechow 
et al., 2011).  In addition, Perols and Lougee (2011) found that companies with excessive 
accruals are more likely to produce fraudulent financial statements.  These researchers as well as 
Mangala and Kumari (2015) and Sharma and Panigrahi (2012) recognized the need for 
additional research in the area of accrual fraud indicators.  The purpose of this quantitative, 
correlational study was to determine if accruals quality could be used as a financial statement 
fraud detection technique.  The Dechow/Dichev model was used to compare accrual quality of 
fraudulent financial statements with the accrual quality of non-fraudulent financial statements.  
The findings suggested that, as expected, the accruals in the fraudulent financial statements were 
of significantly lower quality than the accruals in the non-fraudulent financial statements.  As a 
group, there was a difference in the quality between fraud and non-fraud.  It was not a predictor 
or indicator for a specific company. 
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 The most practical application to professional practice for this study is for investors, 
creditors, and other stakeholders to use the Dechow/Dichev model to measure accrual quality, as 
it was intended to do, rather than use it as an indicator of financial statement fraud.  Prior 
research found that poor quality accruals could be related to the existence of fraud (Ayers et al., 
2006; Badertscher et al., 2012; D’Amico & Mafrolla, 2013; Dechow et al., 2012; Perols & 
Lougee, 2011; Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Dechow, 1994; Foster & Shastri, 2013; Gerakos, 2012).  
This study also found a relationship between the Dechow/Dichev accrual quality model results 
and the presence of financial statement fraud when viewed as a group. 
 This study adds to the accrual fraud detection literature by assessing accrual quality as a 
fraud detection technique.  The findings suggest that accrual quality may be a potential indicator 
of financial statement fraud.  Therefore, accountants should not mitigate the importance of 
accrual quality nor dismiss the importance of accruals in financial statement analysis.  Accruals 
are a normal part of business and the subjective nature of many accrual transactions provides an 
opportunity for easy financial statement manipulation.   
 Accountants must be trustworthy, honest, and reliable while following guidelines and 
principles set forth by regulators and the profession’s governing agencies.  Biblical concepts 
cover ethical issues that may be applied to business situations to provide clarity to tough 
situations, including fraud.  Fraud is theft and God’s Ten Commandment’s instruct us not to steal 
(Mark 10:19).  Proverbs 20:17 states, “food gained by fraud tastes sweet, but one ends up with a 
mouth full of gravel.”  Also, Romans 13:1-4 instructs us to obey governing authorities and 
regulations.  Unfortunately, not all accountants and managers of financial information are 
trustworthy and some turn to fraudulent activity. 
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 Pressure and rationalization are two of the fraud triangle theory characteristics that are 
present when fraud occurs (Dellaportas, 2013) and are part of the theoretical framework of this 
study.  God’s word provides us with direction on how to overcome these characteristics of 
fraudulent behavior.  To mitigate financial pressure, Proverbs 3:9-10 instructs us to “honor the 
Lord with your wealth…then your barns will be filled to overflowing, and your vats will brim 
with new wine.”  In other words, good financial stewards are rewarded.  Rationalization is the 
process of justifying a behavior.  Fraudsters rationalize their actions; however, Matthew 16:26 
relates to the rationalization of fraudulent behavior as the forfeiting of the soul.  Putting God first 
and removing the idolatry of monetary and social success reduces the pressure and 
rationalization present during fraudulent activity (Albertson, 2016).   
 We Christians are instructed to live our lives with honesty and integrity (Matthew 5:8, 
Proverbs 21:3, Psalm 25:21, & Psalm 112) and these characteristics should flow through to all 
areas of our lives, including our businesses.  We are called to “always strive to do what is good 
for each other and for everyone else” in all parts of our lives (1 Thessalonians 5:15).  Regarding 
the biblical framework related to this study, the findings emphasize the continued need for 
checks and balances within the accounting profession.  Using tools that have been tested and 
proven effective, such as the Dechow/Dichev accrual quality model, we can aid authorities, 
auditors, and management in the detection of fraud.  By detecting financial statement fraud, we 
are providing useful and accurate information for all stakeholders’ decision-making.  These 
actions allow our communities to continue to flourish (Van Duzer, 2010). 
 Concerning the cognate field of accounting, this study adds to the literature on fraudulent 
financial statement detection.  The manipulation of financial statements is the costliest type of 
fraud in the workplace (ACFE, 2016).  Our capital markets and individual company stakeholders 
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rely on accurate financial statements for decision-making.  The application of the results of fraud 
theory research, accrual quality research, and financial statement fraud detection research 
strengthens the data used for decision-making, therefore strengthening our capital markets as a 
whole. 
Recommendations for Action 
 Users of financial statements include investors, analysts, auditors, regulators, and other 
stakeholders of businesses.  The capital markets rely on the accuracy of information provided in 
financial statements.  The results of this study can be of use to all stakeholders of businesses who 
are looking for indicators of financial statement quality.  The Dechow/Dichev model may be a 
reliable indicator of the quality of the accruals presented which is an important characteristic to 
consider when analyzing financial statements.   
 One recommended action is to increase awareness of the many models of accrual quality 
and their usefulness in financial statement analysis.  Accountants, analysts, and auditors have 
access to a plethora of publications that cover their particular area of accounting.  The AICPA 
and FASB websites send out regulation updates regularly as well as publications for use in 
accounting practice.  In addition, organizations such as the National Society of Accountings 
(NSA), Chartered Institute of Internal Auditors, and state CPA agencies publish newsletters and 
magazines reporting recent findings in accounting research.  The results of this study could be 
disseminated through any of these means in order to increase awareness of and application of 
accrual quality models. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
 Accounting research is continually developing to identify more ways to uncover 
fraudulent financial statement activity.  Despite the variety of fraud detection literature, a gap 
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exists regarding the detection of fraudulent financial reporting related specifically to revenue 
accrual misstatements (Dechow et al., 2011; Mangala & Kumari, 2015; Perols & Lougee, 2011).  
Further research should focus on finding additional indicators of financial statement fraud by 
applying existing accrual models such as Jones (1991), Dechow et al. (1995), Beneish (1999), 
Larcker and Richardson (2004), Kothari et al. (2005), or by creating models yet to be identified.  
Future studies should include expanding the periods used to include more years of AAERs 
issued.  In addition, specific industries could be analyzed separately to identify normal accrual 
levels for particular markets.  Finally, this study found that as a group there was a difference in 
the quality between fraud and non-fraud.  The results were not a predictor or indicator for a 
specific company.  A study is needed that could provide the missing link in detecting potential 
fraud in a way that could predict fraud in individual companies rather than the two groups. 
Reflections 
 The results of this study were what I expected.  The Dechow/Dichev model proved to be 
effective in estimating fraudulent accrual quality to be lower than non-fraudulent accrual quality; 
in addition, I anticipated that low accrual quality would be an indication of financial statement 
fraud.  Since accruals are subjective and easy to manipulate and have been found to be of low 
quality in years of financial statement fraud (Perols & Lougee, 2011), it seemed logical that they 
could be used as a detection technique.  Accruals are an easy avenue to commit fraud and should 
continue to be analyzed in order to find an analytical procedure that proves to be useful for the 
detection of financial statement fraud. 
 I have been on the doctoral journey for three years and this dissertation has been a part of 
my life for the past year.  The research process was strenuous, but not unbearable.  My biggest 
challenge was time management.  The most demanding and time-intensive requirement was the 
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literature review and theoretical framework.  While the data collection also required a lot of time, 
I thoroughly enjoyed digging through financial statements and gathering the data.  Since this 
study used archival data, I do not feel as if any personal biases were introduced in the data 
collection process. 
As I reflect on this accounting research, I am reminded that accounting is the language of 
business.  Just as we have different words for the same objects (e.g., automobile/vehicle, 
house/home, trip/vacation, child/kid, etc.) we can also have different applications of accounting 
rules.  Different accountants may interpret some of the accounting language, or rules, differently 
while still being legally applied.  These subjective applications of rules and estimates make it 
difficult to compare the financial results of businesses.  Therefore, we must do the best we can 
with the analytical tools we have.  This study attempted to add to our collection of financial 
statement analysis tools regarding accruals, one of the most subjective areas of financial 
statements. 
 Biblically, this study follows the passage found in Proverbs 27:17, “As iron sharpens 
iron, so one person sharpens another.”  Accounting research, just like any subject, relies heavily 
on existing literature and those researchers who have a passion in the same area as their own.  
Each study added to the existing literature improves the information available to those who 
follow us in the profession.  In addition, each study related to financial misstatement improves 
the efficiency of detecting fraud which improves our capital markets overall.  It is my hope that 
this study is one piece of iron that sharpens others in order to strengthen accounting literature and 
the profession as a whole. 
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Summary and Study Conclusions 
 The purpose of this study was to add to the literature regarding financial statement fraud 
detection techniques by examining the relationship between accrual quality and financial 
statement fraud.  The Dechow/Dichev model has proven to be an effective model in predicting 
accrual quality and, therefore, was chosen as the accrual model for this study.  Data were 
collected from SEC AAERs issued in 2015 and 2016.  Using purposive, criterion sampling, 
fraudulent companies were chosen from the AAERs and similar, non-fraudulent companies were 
chosen for the non-fraud group.  The Dechow/Dichev model was applied to the data to compare 
the accrual quality for each group.  Then, the standardized residuals produced for each group by 
the Dechow/Dichev model were used as the variables for the correlation analysis.  An 
independent t-test was conducted to examine the relationship between accrual quality and 
financial statement fraud.  The results indicated that the Dechow/Dichev model estimated accrual 
quality lower for fraudulent companies and low accrual quality might be considered an indicator 
of fraudulent activity.  Significant difference was found in the revenue accrual quality for 
companies with detected financial statement fraud and similar companies without detected 
financial statement fraud.  Research on the topic of accounting fraud detection techniques should 
continue with additional tests to aid auditors, regulators, and other stakeholders in making 
informed decisions when using financial statement data. 
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Appendix A:  Non-Fraud Group Data 
 
 
NON-FRAUDULENT COMPANIES
(in thousands)
Company Name CFO t-1 CFO t CFO t+1 ∆WC t
Harris Corp. FY2009 555,500 666,800 802,700 (14,700)
Harris Corp. FY2010 666,800 802,700 833,100 46,600
Harris Corp. FY2011 802,700 833,100 852,900 (49,200)
First Farmers & Merchants Corp. FY2009 10,515 (3,866) 8,828 (14,848)
Mueller Industries FY2008 185,844 185,760 77,388 60,231
Mueller Industries FY2009 185,760 77,388 56,357 (7,737)
Mueller Industries FY2010 77,388 56,357 153,749 (56,279)
Mueller Industries FY2011 56,357 153,749 108,297 21,393
Nortech Systems, Inc. FY2012 (874) 4,622 276 2,095
Principal Financial Group, Inc. FY2010 2,243,000 2,791,700 2,713,300 1,464,800
Principal Financial Group, Inc. FY2011 2,791,000 2,713,300 3,080,900 1,482,600
Principal Financial Group, Inc. FY2012 2,713,300 3,080,900 2,221,200 2,054,600
M&T Bank Corporation FY2010 1,189,389 1,675,647 1,772,246 274,376
Teradata Corporation FY2012 513,000 575,000 510,000 (53,000)
Teradata Corporation FY2013 575,000 510,000 680,000 (99,000)
PrimeEnergy Corporation FY2010 34,060 62,211 41,339 15,368
TESSCO Technologies FY2007 3,318 28,026 4,160 15,325
TESSCO Technologies FY2008 28,026 4,160 15,156 (7,473)
TESSCO Technologies FY2009 4,160 15,156 14,811 3,618
TESSCO Technologies FY2010 15,156 14,811 12,038 (2,772)
TESSCO Technologies FY2011 14,811 12,038 21,746 (3,625)
Icahn Enterprises FY2009 893,000 365,000 41,000 740,000
Icahn Enterprises FY2010 365,000 41,000 1,995,000 1,137,000
Icahn Enterprises FY2011 41,000 1,995,000 1,514,000 (3,106,000)
Citizens & Northern Corp. FY 2010 12,968 35,046 37,464 9,322
Citizens & Northern Corp. FY 2011 35,046 37,464 27,652 4,672
NBT Bancorp, Inc. FY2010 54,684 89,437 83,765 9,272
Atlantic Power Corporation FY2012 55,900 167,100 152,400 2,700
Atlantic Power Corporation FY2013 167,100 152,400 65,000 47,100
Atlantic Power Corporation FY2014 152,400 65,000 87,400 (18,600)
The InterGroup Corp. FY2009 3,092 7,032 5,684 3,379
The InterGroup Corp. FY2010 7,032 5,684 2,965 (2,947)
Stage Stores, Inc. FY2010 120,936 77,875 78,055 (37,869)
Stage Stores, Inc. FY2011 77,875 78,055 75,981 (33,913)
Primerica, Inc. FY2010 716,344 41,057 87,215 (116,062)
Primerica, Inc. FY2011 41,057 87,215 119,978 22,813
KBR, Inc. FY2007 931,000 248,000 124,000 190,000
KBR, Inc. FY2008 248,000 124,000 (36,000) (320,000)
KBR, Inc. FY2009 124,000 (36,000) 549,000 (495,000)
KBR, Inc. FY2010 (36,000) 549,000 650,000 180,000
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FRADULENT COMPANIES NON-FRAUDULENT COMPANIES
(in thousands) (in thousands)
Company Name CFO t-1 CFO t CFO t+1 ∆WC t
Computer Sciences Corp. FY2009 1,343,000 1,986,000 1,643,000 (885,000)
Computer Sciences Corp. FY2010 1,986,000 1,643,000 1,564,000 (418,000)
Computer Sciences Corp. FY2011 1,643,000 1,564,000 1,176,000 (426,000)
FNCB Bancorp, Inc. FY2009 11,215 3,641 5,792 (12,433)
General Cable Corporation FY2008 231,700 229,400 546,300 (155,100)
General Cable Corporation FY2009 229,400 546,300 98,900 346,600
General Cable Corporation FY2010 546,300 98,900 97,300 (144,200)
General Cable Corporation FY2011 98,900 97,300 288,600 (141,300)
IEC Electronics Corp. FY2012 12,806 12,970 (4,338) (4,763)
INTL FCStone, Inc. FY2010 17,400 113,000 209,000 91,700
INTL FCStone, Inc. FY2011 113,000 209,000 (92,100) 155,400
INTL FCStone, Inc. FY2012 209,000 (92,100) 44,900 23,200
Keybanc Capital Markets, Inc. FY2010 2,320,000 2,724,000 1,890,000 1,116,000
Logitech International FY2012 156,742 196,142 116,990 1,555
Logitech International FY2013 196,142 116,990 205,421 21,454
Miller Energy Resources, Inc. FY 2010 (1,721) (2,160) 7,734 202,219
ModusLink Global Solutions FY2007 16,636 52,627 (5,792) 12,197
ModusLink Global Solutions FY2008 52,627 (5,792) 35,943 (43,141)
ModusLink Global Solutions FY2009 (5,792) 35,943 41,148 18,105
ModusLink Global Solutions FY2010 35,943 41,148 (3,217) 371
ModusLink Global Solutions FY2011 41,148 (3,217) (14,452) (16,389)
Monsanto Company FY2009 2,799,000 2,236,000 1,398,000 (1,240,000)
Monsanto Company FY2010 2,236,000 1,398,000 2,814,000 (702,000)
Monsanto Company FY2011 1,398,000 2,814,000 3,051,000 280,000
Orrstown Financial Services, Inc. FY2010 12,511 24,808 34,855 1,893
Orrstown Financial Services, Inc. FY2011 24,808 34,855 18,658 3,165
Park National Corporation FY2010 72,338 126,134 126,731 (8,794)
Powersecure International, Inc. FY2012 (5,481) 10,852 (2,164) 4,116
Powersecure International, Inc. FY2013 10,852 (2,164) 12,056 (14,457)
Powersecure International, Inc. FY2014 (2,164) 12,056 713 8,003
St. Joe Company FY2009 48,459 50,735 16,312 (23,167)
St. Joe Company FY2010 50,735 16,312 (9,839) 52,607
Stein Mart, Inc. FY2010 19,356 98,329 49,632 40,515
Stein Mart, Inc. FY2011 98,329 49,632 59,568 (18,537)
The Phoenix Companies FY2010 (583,000) (258,000) (138,400) (515,800)
The Phoenix Companies FY2011 (258,000) (138,400) (520,800) (263,800)
Weatherford International FY2007 1,087,019 872,506 1,104,568 (863,599)
Weatherford International FY2008 872,506 1,104,568 614,322 (949,153)
Weatherford International FY2009 1,104,568 614,322 1,128,000 (515,715)
Weatherford International FY2010 614,322 1,128,000 833,000 (182,000)
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